The day before the 23rd anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to China, Beijing enacted national security legislation for Hong Kong. This legislation, unsurprisingly, invited protests and criticism from Western countries, but apparently, Beijing does not give a damn.
It is worth exploring what signal Beijing sent or aimed to send by imposing the legislation after the anti-extradition movement triggered a series of US sanctions.
The first estimation is that Beijing believes US President Donald Trump will lose the US presidential election in November, not so much because of the US-China trade dispute, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Former US vice president Joe Biden, the presumptive Democratic candidate, appears more vulnerable than Trump in terms of his China policy. Therefore, Beijing is not worried about its bold move toward Hong Kong.
Nonetheless, this estimation fails to consider the US congressional consensus on taking a hard line against China over Hong Kong.
That said, US foreign policies or trade relations are largely dominated by the US president.
Second, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) seems determined to fulfill his “China Dream” and leave a legacy for the Chinese Communist Party. His ego has prompted him to pursue China’s hegemonic ambitions against all odds.
US-China relations have become confrontational, but China under the Xi regime seems not to be intimidated. Of course, once it appears so, Xi would be devoured by party factions. That is an existential struggle for China and for Xi.
Third, what about Hong Kong? Obviously, Beijing cares more about its own authority than about Hong Kong’s prosperity. The word autonomy is of course absent in the context of the legislation.
As the legislation extends to foreigners in Hong Kong and anyone committing “crimes” in foreign countries, the foundation for Hong Kong’s economy has been uprooted, and capital outflows are likely to accelerate.
Does this mean that Beijing no longer needs Hong Kong as an intermediary for trade or a hub to attract foreign investment?
Will Hong Kong remain a safe intermediary for Western countries to access the Chinese market? Are Western countries still interested in doing so?
Finally, what does this imply for Taiwan? As is known, the “one country, two systems” formula was originally designed by Beijing to lure Taiwan into unifying with China, and Hong Kong happened to be a testing point.
The enactment of the new legislation has made it clear that Beijing does not care to fake it anymore. An even tougher stance against Taiwan is inevitable. Yet what could be worse? Is military conflict unthinkable or should Taiwan think about it now?
Wu Chien-huei is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of European and American Studies.
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