Mon, Apr 06, 2020 page6

• Walter Lohman On Taiwan: Keep an eye on the US Congress

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  The passage of Sen. Gardner’s and Rep. Curtis’ TAIPEI Act last month is a good occasion to take a look at Congress’ wherewithal on Asia policy. At a time in American history so deeply characterized by executive power (beginning long before the present administration), it’s easy to forget Congress’ role.

  Right now, of course, like every legislature in the world, America’s has been consumed with responding to the COVID-19 crisis. But consider where it was before the corona virus arrived. Even with the Senate in one party’s control and the House in the other’s, over the last several years, Congress has gotten deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific.

  Readers will be familiar with some of the recent measures singed into law, in addition the TAIPEI Act. In 2018, there were the Taiwan Travel Act and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. Last year, there was the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, and its less-advertised companion banning the export of munitions to the Hong Kong police.

  

  All in all, a little over half-way through the current Congress, more than twice as many bills have been introduced concerning China and Taiwan as compared to five years ago. And that’s just part of the Asia-related activity. Congress has led the way on North Korea policy for two administrations. It is pushing for re-imposition of sanctions on Burma. And it has set the parameters around US relations with the Duterte-led government in the Philippines.

  Now, skeptics will say this is all perfunctory. Who cares about yet another demand for a strategy document or report? A “Sense of the Congress resolution” or “statement of policy,” they might say, “are not worth the paper they are written on.” And as for sanctions, they are at the discretion of the President, even when Congress makes them “mandatory.”

  On the first objection, they’ve got a point — in the strictest sense. The executive branch — State Department, in particular (under Republicans or Democrats) — routinely does as little as necessary to comply with reporting mandates. The reports are often comical in their brevity and irrelevance. A report required by Congress in 2016 on how the government intended to promote Taiwan’s meaningful participation in INTERPOL was a grand total of 2.5 pages. It was basically a restatement of developments that prompted passage of the legislation in the first place.

  That said, historically, some reporting requirements have had outsized impact. Take the amendment that required the annual China military power report 20 years ago. Offered by a member with no particular profile on China policy, Rep. Bob Ney, the House passed it by voice vote along with two dozen other “noncontroversial” amendments. There is only one other publicly available government document on China as influential, USTR’s report on China’s WTO compliance. It was also required by Congress.

  As for Sense of Congress resolutions and statements of policy, they shouldn’t be so easily dismissed. There is a reason the PRC and other targets of these measures complain so vociferously about them. Just look at Beijing’s reaction to the TAIPEI Act. Foreign capitals are not as jaded as Washington. They know that Congressional sentiments are leading indicators of the US government’s direction. Congress is not operating in its own little world. It is integrated into the broader American policy community and more tightly tied to American public opinion than either of the other two branches.

  With sanctions policy, sure, the executive exercises a great deal of discretion. But critics ignore how much smarter Congress has gotten in the last 10-15 years. A victim of its own success with South Africa sanctions, in the 1990s, Congress aimed big. Sanctions were about countries. Today, they are predominantly targeted at offending government officials or other powerful persons.

  Congress is also more strategic in the way it works will on the executive branch. The Cambodia Democracy Act now pending in Congress is a perfect example. It requires the President to submit a list of individuals undermining democracy or responsible for human rights abuses. The President can waive the requirement to impose sanctions on these people. But, having identified them as the scum of the earth, he’ll have a lot of explaining to do. At the same time, not identifying them — in the face of the facts — opens the administration up to severe criticism. In a case like Cambodia, where outside the moral cause the diplomatic stakes are so low, it’s easier to just do what Congress says.

  In the broadest sense, skeptics of Congress’ role in Asia policy are right. The branches share power over foreign affairs, and on a bi-partisan basis, many Congressmen and Senators don’t seem much interested in fully exercising their share. Over the longer term, however, they are dead wrong. There are leaders in Congress helping it find its footing. And it is showing.

  Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
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