On Jan. 28, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) visited Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) in the South China Sea to bring Lunar New Year cheer to the troops stationed on the island.
There, Ma reiterated his South China Sea peace initiative, saying that the sovereignty claims of the nation involved should not hinder joint development of the region.
The statement was in line with his previous remarks and the spirit of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. More importantly, it was a reiteration of the nation’s “existing territory” as stated in the Constitution and it indirectly confirmed that “one China” refers to the Republic of China (ROC), instead of the People’s Republic of China.
However, Ma’s visit might be interpreted differently by the governments in Hanoi, Washington and Beijing, as well as by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).
First, the Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei expressed its opposition on the eve of Ma’s trip. Vietnam has always been opposed to Taiwan’s claim to the Spratly (Nansha, 南沙) and Paracel (Hsisha, 西沙) islands.
However, for the South China Sea issue, Hanoi has not separated Taipei from Beijing. If it takes any action against Taipei over the dispute, this might lead to an inappropriate intervention by Beijing.
Vietnam is busy forming its new government, in which the pro-China camp is gaining the upper hand. Therefore, it is not a good time for a conflict between Taiwan and Vietnam.
Meanwhile, the American Institute in Taiwan also expressed its disappointment over Ma’s trip, although not for high-minded reasons such as regional peace. Washington is concerned with recruiting Hanoi against China and it has worked hard to ensure a “strategic alliance” formed by Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines, so as not to be shaken by disputes in the South China Sea.
If a strategic variable occurs on the South China Sea issue, or Beijing chooses to echo Taipei’s island claim, this would not be an attractive spectacle for Washington. Thus, its expression of disappointment revealed a certain degree of strategic anxiety and indirectly put pressure on the president-elect and DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to reverse the situation after taking office.
It is inconvenient for Beijing to praise Ma’s move.
However, as he indirectly reiterated the “existing territory” from a constitutional view, he has put more pressure on Tsai, who promises to follow the constitutional order after taking office.
The constitutional order refers to not only the national title, but also the “existing territory.” Tsai must have discussed this with Washington during her visit to the US.
On the night she was elected president, she hinted that the ROC is concerned with all the islands that it is occupying — without mentioning the nations’s territorial seas.
Beijing is likely to demand that she clarify her stance sooner or later.
As the Vietnamese and the US representatives showed their opposition to Ma’s visit to the troops on Itu Aba Island, they were worried about Beijing. The difference is that Hanoi does not see Taipei and Beijing as two separate parties in the South China Sea issue, while Washington does.
This is why Ma thinks that the Vietnamese representative’s negative reaction would not affect Taiwan-Vietnam relations, but Tsai thinks that Ma has damaged trust between China and the US, as well as mutual trust between Taiwan and Vietnam, while hurting the nation’s “going south” policy.
Shih Chih-yu is a professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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