The Taipei District Court on Friday found Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Taipei City Councilor Lai Su-ju (賴素如) guilty of bribery and sentenced her to 10 years in prison. However, this is not the final verdict and no one knows whether the final verdict is set to be as severe.
The reason the charges stood must have been that the transaction in question violated some legally defined limits to official authority. In other words, if the transaction had not been part of a civil servant’s official duties, it would have been very difficult to prove bribery and issue such a heavy sentence, even if a huge sum had been received from the counterpart.
As city councilors are elected representatives, no administrative affairs fall within the scope of their official duties. If they receive funds or benefits in their private capacity, it is difficult to prove the quid pro quo required for corruption.
WIDER DEFINITION
The judicial interpretation often applies a wider definition of official conduct. This has been particularly true of the Supreme Court in recent years, which has followed the Supreme Court of Japan’s verdict in the case against former Japanese prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, and adopted a wider definition of practical influence.
According to this view, because they have far-reaching monitoring powers over administrative agencies, if a city councilor with concrete practical influence over administrative affairs accepts donations from the public and then lobbies in their favor or uses budget decisions to threaten the concerned agencies, bribery can also be involved.
In the case of Lai, the court felt that while the bid for the Taipei Gateway project fell within the legally defined authority of the Taipei City Government, Lai could use the budget or the passage of legislation to protect the developer. Therefore, it was determined that she had practical influence and that bribery in connection to the practice of official duties could thus be involved.
DIFFERENT VERDICTS
However, because the definition of “practical influence” is vague and unclear, it is difficult to prevent different judges establishing different verdicts in similar cases based on the view of the individual judge. At the same time, since no precedent has been set, no restrictions are placed on the judge.
One obvious comparison is the case against former Cabinet secretary-general Lin Yi-shih (林益世). When the court of first instance issued its verdict last year, it took a strict view of official powers based on a strict legal interpretation of the practice of official duties and did not issue a heavy penalty based on the Anti-Corruption Act (貪污治罪條例).
This means that if Lai appeals there is a chance that the verdict might be overturned. So whether Lai is found guilty of corruption in the final verdict depends not on objective legal regulations and stipulations, but on the interpretation of the judge.
More importantly, even if a heavy sentence is issued in the court of first instance, the current state of investigations into corruption and bribery implies that there is still a long way to go before a final verdict is reached.
This means that the accused can continue to stand in elections and even use her “victimhood” to win sympathy and votes as a “victim of judicial procedure.”
It is clear that all talk of heavy sentencing for corruption is all about propaganda and grand statements.
Wu Ching-chin is an associate professor and chair of Aletheia University’s law department.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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