The death toll from the Sichuan earthquake is in the tens of thousands and climbing. A reasonable assumption is that as communications and access in the disaster zone improve, the number will grow still higher. Experience shows that disaster data and the type of disaster are factors determining the effectiveness of relief. Such was the case after Taiwan’s 921 Earthquake.
The same is true with Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, where poor communications and deliberate blocks on information by the government have hindered international relief efforts.
To maximize rescue options in the crucial first 72 hours after an event, hard information must be available.
Otherwise, even abundant supplies would be of no avail, as rescuers would have no leverage and may inadvertently waste resources.
Alternatively, rescue groups can first be sent to a disaster zone to hunt for victims, but the greater uncertainty in doing this might limit its success.
In China’s case, detailed information and channels of communication can be more important than material resources.
There are several reasons for a lack of disaster information. External communication may be cut off and roads blocked in disaster areas.
Exact figures on casualties may therefore not be available to either the government or private relief organizations. Even Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s (溫家寶) relief team could not get beyond Dujiangyan on their way to Wenchuan, and so were unable to reach the most seriously affected areas. In addition, media reports have said that there has been no contact with nearly 60,000 people near the epicenter, indicating that much information remains unavailable.
Added to this, the Chinese government and media’s grasp of the situation is fragmented.
The Chinese government also has strict control of the media and other communications. It would therefore be logical to assume that communication networks are not well developed.
China has relaxed certain media controls, but the regulations there are still much stricter than in Taiwan. This is not likely to change in the short term.
With the 921 Earthquake, large parts of Nantou and Taichung counties were completely cut off. Luckily, amateur radio enthusiasts were able to piece together valuable information for relief agencies so that rescue teams were able to arrive in the disaster areas earlier.
However, their capabilities were limited, and many of these places were unable to state what they needed before relief arrived.
When the Central Weather Bureau said the epicenter of the quake was in Chichi Township (集集) in Nantou County, many assumed that the situation there would be the most severe.
Later, Puli Township (埔里) in Nantou also reported severe damage, and the media then focused on those areas, leading the public and officials to focus their attention on them.
When Chungliao (中寮) and Kuohsing (國姓) townships reported damage of similar severity, a lack of communication channels and transportation delayed the influx of aid.
On the whole, the media focused on Nantou, which quickly received large amounts of aid from the public and the government.
The Nantou County commissioner called for drinking water, instant noodles, tents and other necessities over the radio, and in just three days, the local school gymnasium, acting as an emergency response center, was overflowing with donations.
Later, the mayor said that they had enough relief and that cash donations were required, and donations quickly arrived from various sources.
Taiwan’s intense media competition turns large-scale disasters into matters of great concern for everyone.
Although relief to certain disaster areas was delayed because they did not receive media attention, media reports can nonetheless work against delays in relief delivery.
More importantly, the media force the government to respond with more gravity to a disaster, thus giving the public an extra layer of security.
The Chinese government should respond to the disaster in Sichuan and surrounding areas by focusing on the collection and dissemination of information in order to maximize the effectiveness of relief work.
Yang Yung-nane is a professor in the Department of Political Science and vice dean of the College of Social Sciences at Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Angela Hong
KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun’s (鄭麗文) recent visit to Beijing and her upcoming visit to Washington will serve as a high-level test of her diplomatic mettle. In Beijing, Cheng was received with symbolic gestures, a warm reception, and high-level access. In Washington, she will receive far less pomp and far sharper questions about the KMT’s vision for the future of Taiwan. Her challenge will be to persuade Washington that the KMT’s engagement with China can coexist with strong deterrence. Cheng’s April 7-12 visit to mainland China coincided with an intense period of conflict in Iran. Despite the strategic significance of Cheng’s trip,
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent the vast Asian chemicals industry into a tailspin. Deprived of the likes of Qatari natural gas and Saudi Arabian oil, the region’s fertilizer and plastics plants are slowing production or even shutting down. Everywhere except China, that is. In petrochemicals, China is unique. As well as a traditional industry that uses oil and gas as feedstock, it has parallel output that relies on its abundant domestic coal. Unsurprisingly, India and other regional powers want to copy and paste the Chinese method. This would not be easy — or climate friendly. The
US President Donald Trump recently repeated his claim that “Taiwan stole America’s chip industry,” reigniting public debate on the issue. As a former Taiwanese minister of economic affairs and an entrepreneur deeply involved in semiconductor supply chain development, I feel a responsibility to clarify this misunderstanding. From the perspective of global industrial evolution and the economic principle of comparative advantage, such a statement appears overly simplistic and risks obscuring the essence of the issue. The rise of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was not built on “replacing America,” but rather emerged as a result of countries pursuing different development paths within the
Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto says he knows how to fix the problems facing Indonesia. Yet his economic mismanagement and authoritarian tendencies are steering the nation toward a familiar mix of currency instability and political chaos. The world’s fourth-most populous nation risks reversing the hard-won democratic and business reforms that came after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. At that time, the rupiah collapsed and the political upheaval that followed forced former president Haji Mohamed Suharto from power. Prabowo’s administration is ignoring similar warning signs. That disconnect was apparent in a national address on Wednesday, when Prabowo projected the swagger that has
RSS