The survival of Taiwan as a de facto independent democratic nation is facing growing perils from all sides. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is steadily developing the capacity to overwhelm and subdue Taiwan with a combination of a multi-pronged blitzkrieg and internal subversion so swiftly that the US will have no time to react.
After five years of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government's policy of "active opening, effective management," Taiwan's economy is becoming increasingly marginalized as capital, technology and skilled manpower migrate westward to China. Ever since then Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) made their pilgrimages to Beijing to pledge allegiance to the People's Republic of China (PRC), the voice of the anti-democracy, anti-US and pro-unification minority has become very strident, while the pro-Taiwan and pro-democracy majority of the people are so disenchanted with the DPP's performance that Pres-ident Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) approval rating has recently hit a record low of 25 percent.
Both Beijing and the KMT/PFP opposition are already confidently counting on the defeat of the DPP candidate in the 2008 presidential election and the peaceful capit-ulation of Taiwan's sovereignty to the PRC soon thereafter. How did Taiwan come to this? Because the governing political leadership lacks a clear vision for Taiwan's future, a vision to commit the nation to the path of freedom.
When the DPP was formed in the late 1980s, the party had a clear vision. Its original party platform stated: "In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, an independent country should be established and a new constitution drawn up in order to make the legal system conform to the social reality in Taiwan and ... the scope of Taiwan's sovereignty over the land and the people should be redefined ... Based on the fundamental rights of the people, the establishment of a sovereign Taiwan Republic and a new constitution shall be determined by all citizens of Taiwan through a national ref-erendum."
This unambiguous goal of establishing a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan, however, was abandoned in the DPP's Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future, passed by the National Party Congress on May 8, 1999. The Resolution stated: "Taiwan is a sovereign and in-dependent country. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all the residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite ... Taiwan should promptly complete the task of incorporating pleb-iscite into law in order to realize the people's rights."
While the Resolution purported to "create a vision for the future," it merely stated: "The ultimate goal of the DPP's China policy is to establish a cross-strait relationship that is mutually beneficial ... peaceful ... and equal."
It was silent on how the goal would be achieved, merely asking the Chinese government to "respect the will of the Taiwanese people." Taiwan's future now rests on the goodwill of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What caused this backtracking of the DPP in 1999? There was concern that overt moves toward independence might trigger PLA military aggression against Taiwan. There was electoral calculation that to win in the presidential election of 2000 it was necessary to reach out to the majority middle-of-the-road voters who wanted to defer the independence/unification issue and to maintain the status quo.
In 2000 Chen won the pres-idency with 39 percent of the vote. It is doubtful that his victory was because of the dilution of the DPP's original platform, in which Chen played a key role. The ob-vious reason was the candidacy of both Lien and Soong, which split the opposition's votes.
While the electoral advantage from the DPP's middle-of-the-road strategy is unclear, the adverse consequences of this departure from the soul and founding spirit of the party are increasingly evident. The "five noes" pledge in Chen's 2000 inaugural address was a natural extension of the 1999 DPP Resolution. Chen promised that if the CCP regime had no intention of using military force against Taiwan, he would among others not declare independence, change the national title or conduct a referendum to change the status quo.
It should be noted that on such vital issues affecting Taiwan's future, he had no authority to make such unilateral concessions without the consent of the people. Worse still, even as China's intent to use non-peaceful means against Taiwan was becoming obvious as Beijing prepared to pass the "Anti-Secession" Law, Chen signed his 10-point agreement with Soong, apparently without discussion or caucus within the DPP, on Feb. 24.
Critics have said that Chen has co-opted the defeated opposition party's platform. The rationale of the Chen-Soong accord was in Point 7, which stated that Taiwan should acquire weapons needed for its national defense. However, PFP legislators have continued to block any discussion of the arms procurement program.
The many concessions Chen made to Soong betrayed the DPP's lack of vision for Taiwan's future. Point 2 of the agreement asked the international com-munity to recognize the current de facto and de jure status of the Republic of China's sovereignty, while Point 3 asserted that no constitutional reform may touch on national sovereignty, territory or the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In effect Chen and Soong have asked the international community to recognize Taiwan's sovereignty over the People's Republic of China and Mongolia -- a self-deceiving delusion.
Chen and Soong agreed to promote trade, cultural and academic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait leading to full implementation of the three links, even as the PLA deploys an ever greater number of missiles against Taiwan and works closely with pro-unification forces within Taiwan to subvert the nation's sovereignty and democracy. Such a policy will clearly further weaken Taiwan's economy and endanger its security.
While Point 6 of the agreement did state that any change in the status quo must have the consent of the 23 million Taiwanese people, the key issue was that unification with the PRC would not be ruled out.
By giving up the vision of freedom which formed the party, the DPP has lost much of its support base. Popular support for the party is now 24 percent, compared to 35 percent for the KMT. There is now a pervasive fear that the KMT will regain power in the 2008 presidential election, and that the chance of preserving Taiwan's status as an independent, dem-ocratic nation will be destroyed.
In early spring this year, Chen was interviewed by Newsweek. In response to the question, "Can you envision a future in which Taiwan and China unify?" he replied: "If one day the people of Taiwan choose to unify with China, it must be done [after] their political situations [achieve] complete synergy, in which both sides enjoy democratic elections, multiparty politics, a truly neutral military [and] freedom of speech. Moreover, by then the average income in China should be about that of the people in Taiwan."
The conditions Chen has stated parallel those stipulated in the National Unification Guideline. Another condition which should be added is that China must first renounce any use of force against Taiwan.
The DPP must return to its roots. The party must rediscover the vision of freedom which enabled it to gain power. A great majority of the Taiwanese people want to keep the country's free and independent status. The DPP must reflect this ardent yearning for freedom and channel the people's energy into unity and purposeful action. An unequivocal commitment to democracy is indispensable to Taiwan's survival as an independent and free nation.
Li Thian-hok is a freelance com-mentator based in Pennsylvania.
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