Positioning himself as the son of Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian (
With his recent, unusual acknowledgement of Taiwan's cultural kinship with China, Chen has appealed for a flexible concept of a new Taiwanese identity. Claiming that Taiwanization is not a simple equivalent of de-Sinicization, Chen makes the sophisticated argument that the nation must forge a new identity by incorporating the past rather than flinging it into oblivion.
According to Chen's reasoning, memorializing the historic scars of the 228 Incident is more a pledge of ethnic equality than a belated accusation of Mainlanders. Quite the opposite, the concept of the New Taiwanese that Chen promotes defines its mem-bers not by their ascribed identity, such as ethnic background, but by their self-achieved identity.
In a democratic country like this one, the freedom to identity oneself with a cultural tradition or political body should be a natural right regardless of birthplace or language. One might not be born here, but one can make oneself a Taiwanese through self-determination.
The idea of being Taiwanese has not had an unchanging essence through history. The latest example is that children of interethnic or interracial couples abound in our society. A recent survey conducted by Common-wealth magazine shows that one in eight newborns has a non-native mother. If these children grow up in Taiwan, they are entitled to nationality regardless of their maternal ancestry.
To look further back, "Tai-wanese" as an identity category has had very different meanings in at different times -- in Aboriginal history, Han immigrant history, under the Japanese colonial regime and during Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) totalitarianism. The task we face today is to break the rigid binary opposition of Mainlanders versus Taiwanese locals and to enrich the New Taiwanese identity category, an identity with cultural differences and ethnic diversity.
One subtle point, however, needs to be made clear: A sense of identification is rooted in multiple layers of soil. To identify with democracy doesn't mean having to make a clear-cut break from 2,000 years of Chinese culture. Emotional and cultural identification with China can coexist with political identification with Taiwan. Far from damaging Taiwanese awareness, such a pluralistic identification demonstrates the liberty of Taiwan's democracy and the flexibility of the concept of being "Taiwanese."
While multiculturalism is shaping our society and internalization has diminished our insularity, we must decry politicians who gain political capital from ethnic confrontation, and be wary of them.
Reacting to Chen's remarks that an independently existing Taiwan was not equivalent to de-Sinicization, the China Daily called him a "reckless, tightrope-walking `president.'"
Chen was quoted as saying, "From the perspective of state dignity and sovereignty equity, Taiwan is not a part of China. But the other way round, from the perspectives of history, blood relationship and culture, China and Chinese culture indeed are a part of Taiwan."
Wang Hsiao-wen is a freelance writer.
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