Is a new foreign partner for Taiwan emerging in the Middle East? Last week, Taiwanese media reported that Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Francois Wu (吳志中) secretly visited Israel, a country with whom Taiwan has long shared unofficial relations but which has approached those relations cautiously. In the wake of China’s implicit but clear support for Hamas and Iran in the wake of the October 2023 assault on Israel, Jerusalem’s calculus may be changing. Both small countries facing literal existential threats, Israel and Taiwan have much to gain from closer ties.
In his recent op-ed for the Washington Post, President William Lai Ching-te (賴清德) announced his intention to quicken “the development of ‘T-Dome,’ a multilayered, integrated defense system designed to protect Taiwan from People’s Republic of China (PRC) missiles, rockets, drones and combat aircraft.” T-Dome takes its inspiration from Israel’s Iron Dome, which protects Israel from short-range projectiles, and which effectively neutered the rocket threat from Hamas, Hezbollah, and other nearby enemies.
Taiwan has a similar vision for securing itself from aerial attacks, though T-Dome must counter a much wider, more sophisticated range of threats. A wholesale export of the Iron Dome system, even if it were possible, would not make much sense. It would not, on its own, solve the dilemma for Taiwan, which faces cruise and ballistic missiles of varying ranges, artillery, rockets, and munitions delivered by aircraft.
But Israel has unique experience in overcoming problems thought to be unsolvable; integrating monitoring, tracking, targeting, and strike systems; and employing them effectively and efficiently. There is much for Taiwan to learn and much Israeli technology that could be applied in Taiwan’s circumstances.
Importantly, Israel has an interest in making that expertise and that technology available. Taiwan’s chip manufacturing prowess has played an important part in the rise of the Israeli tech industry. Although Israel has seen advancements in chip R&D and design, it lags in fabrication. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait and the advanced chip shortage that would inevitably result are not in Israel’s interests. Should Taiwan succeed in developing T-Dome, it will meaningfully contribute to deterring China and to protecting foundries should fighting break out.
But cooperation should extend beyond the realm of defense tech. Few countries understand the PRC or its political system better than Taiwan. As Beijing deepens its influence in the Middle East — both with Israel’s adversaries and with countries with whom Israel has friendlier relations — Jerusalem would benefit from deeper knowledge of China. Sharing intelligence is highly sensitive and likely to be difficult, but both countries have something to gain. Taipei can help Jerusalem understand how China operates and what it hopes to achieve. Jerusalem may be able to provide Taipei with early warning of developments in the Middle East pertinent to Taiwan.
Both countries have also struggled to win battles in the information space. China has successfully advanced specious historical and legal arguments regarding Taiwan’s status that threaten to leave Taipei increasingly isolated. Since it was attacked by Hamas two years ago, Israel has found itself consistently on the losing end of a contest to define its conduct in the eyes of foreign observers. Importantly, there exists a nexus between these two battles. Nongovernmental elements, witting and unwitting, of a Chinese political warfare network have operated in both spaces, pushing narratives critical of Israel and Taiwan. Exchanges on lessons learned and effective tactics are worthwhile.
To deepen their partnership, Israel and Taiwan should consider establishing a fusion center where both countries would share information on narratives circulating in their respective regions that pertain to the other country. Such a center would enable both nations to proactively address misinformation and could serve as an expandable platform through which a growing number of like-minded countries could cooperate in the information space.
Israel is likely to proceed carefully. China is an important economic partner and is securing growing diplomatic heft in the Middle East. But Beijing has also revealed itself to be aligned with the anti-civilizational forces that seek to destroy the Jewish State. This has presented an opening for Taiwan. The Lai administration is rightly taking advantage of the opportunity.
Michael Mazza is senior director for research at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (formerly the Project 2049 Institute) and a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
Jan. 1 marks a decade since China repealed its one-child policy. Just 10 days before, Peng Peiyun (彭珮雲), who long oversaw the often-brutal enforcement of China’s family-planning rules, died at the age of 96, having never been held accountable for her actions. Obituaries praised Peng for being “reform-minded,” even though, in practice, she only perpetuated an utterly inhumane policy, whose consequences have barely begun to materialize. It was Vice Premier Chen Muhua (陳慕華) who first proposed the one-child policy in 1979, with the endorsement of China’s then-top leaders, Chen Yun (陳雲) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), as a means of avoiding the
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
A recent piece of international news has drawn surprisingly little attention, yet it deserves far closer scrutiny. German industrial heavyweight Siemens Mobility has reportedly outmaneuvered long-entrenched Chinese competitors in Southeast Asian infrastructure to secure a strategic partnership with Vietnam’s largest private conglomerate, Vingroup. The agreement positions Siemens to participate in the construction of a high-speed rail link between Hanoi and Ha Long Bay. German media were blunt in their assessment: This was not merely a commercial win, but has symbolic significance in “reshaping geopolitical influence.” At first glance, this might look like a routine outcome of corporate bidding. However, placed in
China often describes itself as the natural leader of the global south: a power that respects sovereignty, rejects coercion and offers developing countries an alternative to Western pressure. For years, Venezuela was held up — implicitly and sometimes explicitly — as proof that this model worked. Today, Venezuela is exposing the limits of that claim. Beijing’s response to the latest crisis in Venezuela has been striking not only for its content, but for its tone. Chinese officials have abandoned their usual restrained diplomatic phrasing and adopted language that is unusually direct by Beijing’s standards. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the