On Jan. 24, China's vice premier Qian Qichen (
This policy statement can be understood from two different angles. First of all, CCP policy toward Taiwan has for a long time been stiff and inflexible, without a true understanding of Taiwanese society and politics. In particular, they misjudged the DPP victory in the presidential election in 2000. They then seriously misjudged the legislative and county commissioner elections in December, in which the DPP won a major victory.
ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
The CCP has to recognize that the DPP is now not only Taiwan's ruling party, but also its largest and it is therefore beginning to face up to this reality and adjust its strategies and tactics. Beijing is leaving its past stance of only being willing to have official contact with the New Party and the KMT and is opening itself to the DPP, welcoming party members to visit in "appropriate capacities" in a hope to break the cross-strait stalemate.
Also, US President George W. Bush will pay a "working visit" to Beijing in late February. To try to win over Bush and improve relations with Washington, Qian's speech was to a large extent meant for American ears, and a present to Bush before the February meeting. Beijing's strategy is to make adjustments in the cross-strait relationship as part of the improved relations between Beijing and Washington. The hope is that the US will influence Taipei's China policies so that it eventually will accept Beijing's "one China" framework.
We are of the opinion that Qian's speech is a mere tactical adjustment of Beijing's policies towards Taiwan. Even though it has the positive effect of improving the atmosphere, the improvement is rather limited. We also need to see Beijing's follow-up policies before we can understand the true intent behind the speech and its value.
Officials in Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office have made gaffes lately in their interpretations of Qian's speech -- such as placing Taiwan's president Chen Shui-bian (
We need to understand that the Taiwan issue cannot be solved simply by Beijing unilaterally implementing some strategic adjustments. The issue involves the balancing of many fundamental factors and interests. We believe that the Taiwan issue represents a situation where unification is not easy, Taiwanese independence is also difficult and the ROC can continue to exist.
There are three factors that demonstrate why unification is not easy:
1. Beijing's inflexible policies concerning Taiwan.
"There is only one China in the world; the mainland and Taiwan belong to one China; China's sovereignty and territory cannot be divided."
This is the three-step "one China" principle that Qian has stated publicly on many occasions, specifically declaring that anything else can be discussed as long as Taiwan accepts this. Looking at the words only, the "China" mentioned in this phrase is probably not the PRC. Otherwise the current cross-strait dispute over the "one China" principle would not exist. It's of course even less likely that Qian would say "one China" means the ROC. It could therefore be interpreted or estimated that the "one China" Qian is talking about is a future China, following the unification of the mainland and Taiwan. At first view, this looks both tolerant and progressive.
However, after mentioning the three-step "one China" policy, Qian also states that Beijing's basic guideline for unification with Taiwan is "peaceful unification, one country two systems." This immediately exposes the contradiction between the first and second parts of Qian's speech and the impossibility of filling in the gaps.
It goes without saying that the "one country" in "one country, two systems" is the PRC, since the model has already been defined in Hong Kong and Macau. The ROC alone is missing from the CCP's "one country, two systems" model. It has been wiped out by words because Taiwan must also become an administrative area in the PRC.
This is what Taiwan's government and general public cannot accept, and this is the locus of the fundamental conflict between China and Taiwan over the Taiwan issue. Since acceptance of the "one country, two systems" will completely break up the ROC's political and national framework currently existing on Taiwan, then wherein lies the dignity of discussing other matters?
In the three-step definition of "one China," Qian only mentions territory and sovereignty but not political system or power. In the "one country, two systems" policy toward Taiwan, however, only a political system and power are mentioned but not territory or sovereignty. The authorities in Beijing have divided their Taiwan policies into two contradictory parts. We wonder how they will implement these policies, and we wonder how Taiwan's government and general public will be able to accept Beijing's policies. Is it the three-step "one China" policy, or the "one country, two systems?"
These basic contradictions in Beijing's policies toward Taiwan are the fundamental cause of Beijing's fuzziness, mistakes, unilateral decisions and failed, overbearing policies over the past 20 years. We therefore believe that if the authorities in Beijing cannot make thorough changes to the fundamental framework of their Taiwan policies, unification will be extremely difficult and peaceful unification impossible.
The lack of focus and coordination between the Taiwan policies of the CCP, the Chinese government and the military, as well as their policy U-turns, are another important reason for the policy failure.
The CCP headquarters has its "Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs" (
Jiang's Taiwan policies place importance on the consideration of political risk, the easing of tensions in international relations and his own place in history. The army's primary considerations, however, are how to gain more political power and budgetary resources in the name of attacking Taiwan. The State Department, meanwhile, considers economic, trade and financial power.
Jiang lacks the prestige and authority of Mao Zedong (
The CCP has already become an interest group, and when a department formulates a concrete policy, the political and economic interests of the decision makers have already been accounted for. Seeking benefits for oneself in the name of public good has become all pervasive. The process for formulating Taiwan policy is no exception.
There is an obvious example of this. Qian, Hu Jintao (
Taiwan's Central News Agency quoted a report released from Beijing by Duowei Media (
But, surprisingly, 48 hours after the symposium on Jiang's "Eight Points," the Qiaobao (
The US-based Duowei Media often claims that it gets scoops from Beijing. If Hu didn't make a statement, why would Duowei cook up a story? How could this be to Duowei's advantage? We think it is not very likely that Duowei started any rumors. The refutation later published by the Wen Wei Po and the Qiaobao was also very curious, affording considerable food for thought. Why did Jiang order the the CCP's Propaganda Department to delete and cover up Hu's speech? Whose interests did his speech come into conflict with?
People familiar with the CCP's internal situation infer that Hu's speech, drawing a formal distinction between different elements within the DDP and clarifying that "Taiwan localization is not equal to Taiwan independence," very possibly originated in the mouth of Jiang. Hu's statements at the forum were surely sanctioned beforehand by Jiang. Given Hu's current status and position, he wouldn't rashly go looking for trouble.
But Hu's speech may have incited a backlash from the CCP's conservative "old guard" and its military hardliners, forcing Jiang to later retract it. Jiang had no choice but to submit to this pressure because he wants to retain his post as chairman of the Central Military Commission. He urgently needs the support of China's military leaders, and must satisfy the military's desire to expand its political power and increase military spending.
Meanwhile, Jiang downplayed the idea of Qian's speech being an adjustment to China's Taiwan policy, stressing instead rigid adherence to the basic policy of "peaceful unification" and "one country, two systems" -- especially the notion that "as long as the DPP has an independence clause in its charter, no DPP delegations will be allowed to visit China."
Over the last three days of January, China's Taiwan affairs officials reiterated that President Chen, Vice President Annette Lu (
Clearly, Beijing's Taiwan policy is being maneuvered by various interest groups within the CCP's political and military wings, and that there are frequent disputes among them. It has been reported that Jiang pointed out in several high-level internal speeches that China's Taiwan policy should incorporate "new thinking," and that the majority of DPP members and the party's newly elected leaders should be differentiated from the extremely small group of "pro-independence die-hards."
Presently, however, the CCP's high-ranking conservatives have joined forces with military hard-liners, not allowing Jiang to take supreme power as Mao and Deng did before him, or develop Taiwan policy under new domestic and foreign circumstances. Taiwan's politicians must pay attention to this and be cautious.
2. The CCP's authoritarian rule has no appeal to Taiwan's political parties.
Since Taiwan has established a democratic system, it is certainly unlikely that Taiwan's political parties would backtrack and accept the rule of an authoritarian regime. The Taiwanese have firmly rejected the "one country, two systems" model adopted in Hong Kong and Macau. It is therefore impossible to unite Taiwan by means of Beijing's "one country, two systems" method. Beijing's insistence on "peaceful unification" and "one country, two systems" can only have Taiwan's 23 million people join hands and oppose it so as to avoid following in Hong Kong's footsteps in becoming a new type of colony. If China wants to force unification, war will be the only way. But, is Beijing so sure about easy victory in this battle?
3 The US will not easily let Beijing unite with Taiwan.
Beijing is crystal clear that the Taiwan issue is closely linked to the international power balance. In particular, Beijing-Washington relations deeply influence Taiwan's future.
The US has never trusted China's authoritarian regime. At present, China's economic reforms are just taking off, and the nation's power is increasing annually. Beijing's short-term goal is to compete with Japan for leadership in the region. Its long-term goal is to take advantage of its hegemony in the region in a bid to compete with the US and expand its power in the entire Asia-Pacific region.
This will directly threaten US interests in the region and the US therefore has been on guard against the Chinese regime.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, the US sent troops to Central Asia in order to eradicate the bases of international terrorists. But this region is right on China's doorstep and lies a stone's throw from it's own troubled province of Xinjiang, where Muslim resentment against Beijing's rule is high.
With the US able to project its military might into an area so close to China, Beijing must realize that it would be extremely foolish to provoke Washington by making a hostile move against Taiwan to force unification of the two sides of the Strait.
Until China becomes a democratic nation, the US will certainly protect Taiwan by various means, and thereby contain the Beijing authorities. It will also use Taiwan's democratic society as an incentive to push Chinese society toward democratization. The US will not hastily let Taiwan declare independence, which could incite a war in the Taiwan Strait and drag the US into the fray.
Beijing should therefore see that the US has already told it in the 1972 Shanghai Communique that it hopes to see a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Then the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act legalizing the provision of military assistance and protection to Taiwan. After two rounds of Chinese missile tests targeting Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, the US expanded the scope of the US-Japan security treaty to include Taiwan.
It is evident that the US' strategic bottom line in regards to Taiwan is maintaining the status quo and waiting for change in China. This is an important international reason why unification is not an easy proposition.
Kam Yiu-yu (金堯如) is the former editor in chief of Hong Kong's Wen Wei Po (文匯報). Chris Wu (伍凡) is editor in chief of China Spring and China Affairs magazines. This is the first of a two-part series. Part two will run tomorrow.
Translated by Perry Svensson and Scudder Smith
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