Many labels, from “pro-China” to “Chinese Communist Party [CCP] proxy,” were attached to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) by its detractors before its defeats in the Jan. 11 elections, but at the time, the party did not seem to worry too much about them.
Post-elections, having realized what devastating effects such labels had, the KMT is resisting accusations that it is a cohort of the CCP.
One notable example was when KMT Legislator Johnny Chiang (江啟臣), who is running for party chair, last week said in a livestream that the KMT has always “opposed the CCP and welcomed the US.”
“Unfortunately, ‘the pan-green camp’ has successfully ‘painted [the KMT] red’ after the KMT lost administrative power, which had caused it to also lose its voice in Washington. This has further deepened the misunderstanding,” Chiang said.
Netizens widely scoffed at the remarks, saying that he had “suffered memory loss.”
Ever since former vice president Lien Chan (連戰) visited China in 2005 when he was KMT chair and met with then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) — less than two months after passage of China’s Anti-Secession Act — the KMT stance of confronting the CCP has all but evaporated.
A host of high-profile incidents cemented the KMT’s public image as a CCP minion.
For example, the KMT boycotted the proposed NT$299 billion (US$9.95 billion at the current exchange rate) purchase of eight diesel-electric submarines many believed to be crucial in narrowing the gap between Taiwan’s and China’s navies.
From 2004 to 2007, the KMT and the People First Party boycotted arms procurement bills 69 times, and then-KMT chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) went as far as to perform self-castration — by saying that the submarine deal contravened the US’ Taiwan Relations Act, as subs are offensive weapons.
The KMT’s vetoing of the arms sale package irritated the administration of then-US president George W. Bush, which subsequently rejected all of the nation’s arms procurement proposals from mid-2006 to October 2008 and closed the window on the submarine purchases.
A classic incident of a key KMT figure acting like a Chinese sycophant also involved Lien, who in 2015 took part in a military parade at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of “Chinese citizens fighting off Japanese forces,” which earned him the “comprador” epithet.
Meanwhile, Chiang was one of 10 KMT lawmakers who on June 1, 2018, met with China’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Liu Jieyi (劉結一). At the meeting Liu touted Beijing’s “31 measures” to entice Taiwanese and reiterated its resolve to oppose “any secessionist activities that promotes Taiwanese independence.”
When the Solomon Islands and Kiribati in September last year switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, Chiang said the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could turn Taiwan from a “US chess piece” into an “abandoned son” by losing influence in the Pacific and Central and South America. His interpretation of Taiwan-US relations and refraining from condemning China raised many eyebrows.
With its history, it is impossible for the KMT to whitewash its image as a CCP minion overnight. Any rash attempt to ape the DPP’s foreign policy would only backfire.
Given the large vested interests involved, it would be impossible for the party to fundamentally change its cross-strait policy, and the best so-called “KMT reformists” can do would likely be rebranding what is old.
As Beijing ramps up its pressure on Taiwan and calls to realize the nation’s right to self-determination steadily increase, the KMT’s cross-strait policy is destined to lose its audience and be buried in the depths of history, quite possibly along with the party.
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