Although the rapid escalation of violence in Hong Kong seems terrifying enough, things might be about to get much worse.
The communique of the recently concluded fourth plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) indicates that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is planning to tighten his grip on the former British colony at any cost. He should prepare to rack up a formidable bill.
The communique includes two ominous pledges: First, China’s central government would “control and rule” Hong Kong (and Macau) using “all the powers vested in [it] under the constitution and the Basic Law,” the mini-constitution that defines Hong Kong’s status.
Second, it would “build and improve a legal system and enforcement mechanism to defend national security” in both special administrative regions.
A few days after the plenum, the CCP’s plan to assert its control over Hong Kong became clearer when it released the full text of the resolution endorsed by its central committee. China’s central government intends to change the process for appointing Hong Kong’s chief executive and key officials, and reform the system governing how the Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee interprets the Basic Law.
Moreover, China would support the strengthening of Hong Kong’s law enforcement capabilities and ensure that the city government enacts legislation to enhance national security. It would also deepen Hong Kong’s economic integration with the mainland and expand “education” programs to cultivate a “national consciousness and patriotic spirit,” especially among civil servants and young people.
Although the details of the plan have yet to be worked out, it seems evident that China’s leaders intend to gut the Basic Law, exercise more direct control over the appointment of key officials, weaken or eliminate Hong Kong’s judicial independence, curtail civil liberties and suppress political dissent, including through ideological indoctrination.
In other words, they have effectively decided to abandon the “one country, two systems” model that then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) promised to uphold for 50 years after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule in 1997.
China’s leaders must know that they are to run into powerful resistance. While some initial steps would be taken in Beijing, the plan’s most substantive measures require action on the ground in Hong Kong. If the ongoing protests have shown anything, it is that Hong Kongers are not going down without a fight.
In fact, China has tried to get Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to pass national security legislation before, in 2003, but about half a million residents took to the streets to protest, forcing the city government to withdraw the bill.
Likewise, China’s attempt in 2012 to institute “patriotic education” in Hong Kong by changing its history textbooks ignited a rebellion among parents and students, forcing the government to back down.
As the CCP attempts to exert total control over Hong Kong, even larger demonstrations, marked by even more violence, are likely. The city would descend further into chaos and become ungovernable.
However, that might well be what China’s leaders want: an excuse to deploy security forces and impose direct control over the city. In that sense, the fourth plenum might mark the beginning of the end of Hong Kong as we know it.
What Xi and the CCP seem not to understand is how much this approach would hurt them. After all, China is likely to lose much of its access to the global financial system as countries revise their relationships with the new Hong Kong.
Already, the US House of Representatives has adopted a bill that, if also passed by the Senate, would mandate an annual review by the US Department of State to determine whether Hong Kong remains sufficiently autonomous to justify its special trading status under US law.
As China’s central government tramples on Hong Kong’s rights, more Western democracies — including those that have hesitated to support US President Donald Trump’s efforts to contain China — are likely to support comprehensive economic sanctions.
It should be obvious that this would be a devastating development for Xi and the CCP, whose legitimacy depends on continued economic growth and improvements in living standards. However, in a country whose top leadership brooks no dissent, there are few safeguards against bad policymaking.
Two years ago, Xi declared that by the time the People’s Republic of China celebrates its centenary in 2049, it should be a “great modern socialist country” with an advanced economy. The fourth plenum communique reiterated this objective. However, if China’s central government reneges on its obligations to Hong Kong, that goal is likely to become little more than a distant dream.
Pei Minxin is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something