Although the rapid escalation of violence in Hong Kong seems terrifying enough, things might be about to get much worse.
The communique of the recently concluded fourth plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) indicates that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is planning to tighten his grip on the former British colony at any cost. He should prepare to rack up a formidable bill.
The communique includes two ominous pledges: First, China’s central government would “control and rule” Hong Kong (and Macau) using “all the powers vested in [it] under the constitution and the Basic Law,” the mini-constitution that defines Hong Kong’s status.
Second, it would “build and improve a legal system and enforcement mechanism to defend national security” in both special administrative regions.
A few days after the plenum, the CCP’s plan to assert its control over Hong Kong became clearer when it released the full text of the resolution endorsed by its central committee. China’s central government intends to change the process for appointing Hong Kong’s chief executive and key officials, and reform the system governing how the Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee interprets the Basic Law.
Moreover, China would support the strengthening of Hong Kong’s law enforcement capabilities and ensure that the city government enacts legislation to enhance national security. It would also deepen Hong Kong’s economic integration with the mainland and expand “education” programs to cultivate a “national consciousness and patriotic spirit,” especially among civil servants and young people.
Although the details of the plan have yet to be worked out, it seems evident that China’s leaders intend to gut the Basic Law, exercise more direct control over the appointment of key officials, weaken or eliminate Hong Kong’s judicial independence, curtail civil liberties and suppress political dissent, including through ideological indoctrination.
In other words, they have effectively decided to abandon the “one country, two systems” model that then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) promised to uphold for 50 years after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese rule in 1997.
China’s leaders must know that they are to run into powerful resistance. While some initial steps would be taken in Beijing, the plan’s most substantive measures require action on the ground in Hong Kong. If the ongoing protests have shown anything, it is that Hong Kongers are not going down without a fight.
In fact, China has tried to get Hong Kong’s Legislative Council to pass national security legislation before, in 2003, but about half a million residents took to the streets to protest, forcing the city government to withdraw the bill.
Likewise, China’s attempt in 2012 to institute “patriotic education” in Hong Kong by changing its history textbooks ignited a rebellion among parents and students, forcing the government to back down.
As the CCP attempts to exert total control over Hong Kong, even larger demonstrations, marked by even more violence, are likely. The city would descend further into chaos and become ungovernable.
However, that might well be what China’s leaders want: an excuse to deploy security forces and impose direct control over the city. In that sense, the fourth plenum might mark the beginning of the end of Hong Kong as we know it.
What Xi and the CCP seem not to understand is how much this approach would hurt them. After all, China is likely to lose much of its access to the global financial system as countries revise their relationships with the new Hong Kong.
Already, the US House of Representatives has adopted a bill that, if also passed by the Senate, would mandate an annual review by the US Department of State to determine whether Hong Kong remains sufficiently autonomous to justify its special trading status under US law.
As China’s central government tramples on Hong Kong’s rights, more Western democracies — including those that have hesitated to support US President Donald Trump’s efforts to contain China — are likely to support comprehensive economic sanctions.
It should be obvious that this would be a devastating development for Xi and the CCP, whose legitimacy depends on continued economic growth and improvements in living standards. However, in a country whose top leadership brooks no dissent, there are few safeguards against bad policymaking.
Two years ago, Xi declared that by the time the People’s Republic of China celebrates its centenary in 2049, it should be a “great modern socialist country” with an advanced economy. The fourth plenum communique reiterated this objective. However, if China’s central government reneges on its obligations to Hong Kong, that goal is likely to become little more than a distant dream.
Pei Minxin is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a nonresident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
RSS