The US just sent another couple Navy destroyers through the Taiwan Straits. Like the many that have preceded it under the Trump administration, the maneuver makes a critical point about both the freedom of the seas and American support for Taiwan.
As Commander-in-Chief, only the President and his appointed officials can do such a thing. They should be commended for it. In fact, they are doing pretty well by Taiwan generally, as attested to by the two major arms deals already in the books and a pending deal on new fighter aircraft. It has not been perfect. The administration still has not managed to send a cabinet officer to Taiwan — despite the opportunity of repeated “openings” of the new AIT building. Neither have they picked up on the idea of a US-Taiwan FTA — a piece of fruit hanging so tantalizingly low on the vine that it may spoil.
Hopefully, the administration will finalize the sale of F-16s and move on these other priorities soon.
The executive branch, however, is only part of the story of America’s support for Taiwan. And short of the sudden outbreak of war, it is not actually the most important part. The storehouse of American interest in Taiwan is Congress. It is there that 40 years ago supporters of the ROC pushed back on President Carter’s own half-hearted approach to Taiwan with the Taiwan Relations Act.
Congress keeps each successive administration on task. And today, it is more active on the Taiwan account than it has been in decades.
Twenty years ago, there was the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA), which passed the House only to fall to the threat of a Presidential veto. There was the US Taiwan Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Cooperation Act, another House initiative that stalled in the Senate. Finally, among many pro-Taiwan resolutions passed in those years, there was the successful effort to get President Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) a visa to visit his alma mater at Cornell University.
Today, there is the Taiwan Travel Act, which was signed into law last year. There is the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which every year now contains an array of Taiwan-related provisions, some of which like demands for greater military-to-military contact and US Navy port calls have occasioned responses from Beijing. Then this year, the Ranking Member and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR) introduced the Taiwan Assurance Act (TAA).
These contemporary measures are not as bold as those in the 1990s. In its original form, the 1999 TSEA essentially laid out the weapons systems the President was to sell Taiwan. This may have prepared the ground for the Bush administration’s first big arms sales package. Yet, the TSEA itself — in virtually any form — was doomed to fail. President Clinton made that clear at the time.
In 2019, leaders like Rep Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Rep Eliot Engel (D-NY), the principal sponsors of the TAA, are looking for more immediate results. They have set out to pass a bill. The most important clause of the TAA directs the Secretary of State to issue new diplomatic guidance on Taiwan that is more expansive and respectful of Taiwan’s democracy than current guidelines. It might be a modest aim, but it is critically important. The way the US treats Taiwan diplomatically is in desperate need of an update.
This is not to say the current Congress is not also pushing the edges of the debate over Taiwan policy. The Ranking Republican of the House Foreign Affairs Asia Pacific Subcommittee Ted Yoho (R-FL) is explicitly calling for Taiwan independence. Also in the debate-stretching category, five Senators, led by the Subcommittee Chairman in the Senate Cory Gardner (R-CO), have called for President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) to address a joint session of Congress.
These ideas are not going anywhere. Nevertheless, like the TSEA, they too, are important markers in the Washington policy debate.
The two eras share certain dynamics.
The surge of Congressional activity in the 1990s was driven by three factors: A climate of alarm generated by allegations of Chinese technology theft; consideration of permanent normal trade relations (NTR) for China (support many members balanced with votes for Taiwan); and a presidency weakened through confrontation with an opposition-controlled Congress.
Aided by the 1995-1996 missile crisis, Congress went into overdrive in support of Beijing’s opposite number in Taipei.
Today, Chinese technology theft is again making headlines. The US and China are again negotiating a landmark trade deal. And as for the Congressional-Executive balance, Democrats in the House are already giving President Trump trouble. Depending on the outcome of the 2020 elections, the political configuration could become even more conducive to confrontation.
The point is that under the right circumstances, the edges of a debate can gravitate to the center. Depending on the strength and disposition of the US President, this could push US policy on Taiwan in a much stiffer direction.
Foreign observers of American policy-making focus almost exclusively on the executive branch. This is partly because they have the greatest exposure to its representatives. It is also because Americans themselves have become extraordinarily executive-minded over the last 80-90 years. But even as friends of Taiwan celebrate the Trump administration’s support, it is important to keep track of what’s going on in the institution that will survive it. Over the long-term, Congress is a more reliable barometer of American support than any single Presidential administration. And its support is strong.
Walter Lohman is director of the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.
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