Panama established diplomatic relations with China in June last year and the Dominican Republic followed suit on Monday last week. For China, these diplomatic switches are countermoves against a series of Taiwan-friendly moves by the US, and are intended to keep up the pressure on President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) administration, which refuses to accept that “Taiwan and the mainland both belong to ‘one China,’” as Beijing demands.
The “live fire” of Beijing’s policies targeting Taiwan is the attitude of its foreign affairs departments toward the Republic of China (ROC).
It says that only the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has the right to represent China. Consequently, they insist that the ROC’s flag, national anthem and all its political symbols must be banished from international venues and events, and that the political symbols of the PRC and the ROC cannot be displayed in the same place at the same time.
Years ago, then-president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) took a similar attitude. He said that a legitimate government — the ROC — could not coexist with an illegitimate one — the PRC. As a result, other nations could not have diplomatic relations with both of them and had to decide between them.
From the 1970s onward, the two sides wrangled over diplomatic relations, going through various ups and downs, just as they are doing now.
The “diplomatic truce” that prevailed during eight years of Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency was just a halftime break, which Beijing permitted in exchange for Ma’s acceptance that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belonged to “one China” — a stance that put Taiwan in the position of a vassal state.
Panama first established diplomatic relations with the Qing Empire in 1910 and those ties continued under the empire’s successor state, the ROC.
The Dominican Republic established diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1941. These ties were the products of a time when the ROC was the only legitimate government of China.
With the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971, the “illegitimate” PRC took the place of the ROC in the UN, including the Security Council.
Apart from international realities and the domestic needs of various nations, the most important reason why UN members voted for the resolution was that the PRC really was the only legitimate government of China. Even Taiwan’s nativist government authorities do not deny it. It is the reality — legally and practically.
When the ROC’s diplomatic allies switch recognition to the PRC, it is no use to accuse Beijing of leveraging its “one China” principle.
Taiwanese have to look at the matter on a deeper level to see the true state of Taiwan’s foreign relations, namely that its diplomatic allies still recognize the ROC as representing China. The government does not ask them to recognize Taiwan as representing Taiwan, nor do they do so.
As long as this remains the case, how can Taiwan escape its predicament?
Beijing has continuously employed a two-fold strategy in relation to the ROC.
The first set of tactics is Beijing’s foreign affairs departments clearing the battlefield in international forums. Their task is to finish off the remnants of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), so that the ROC ceases to exist in name and fact.
The other set of tactics consists mainly of “united front” tactics employed by the Taiwan Affairs Office. The office and its branches have the task of concealing the offensives launched by Beijing’s foreign affairs departments. To this end, they talk in ways that leave room for imagination, thereby desensitizing Taiwanese and lowering their vigilance about China’s hostile intentions.
The “united front” strategy has been most successful in the case of unification advocates in the pan-blue camp. They have completely forgotten the painful lessons learned by Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), and their warnings about communist China. They cover their eyes and refuse to see the slaughter that is taking place on the diplomatic battlefield.
They would rather find comfort in the romantic language of the “united front.” The most typical example of such people is Ma.
Beijing’s diplomatic actions illustrate the harsh reality that exists between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and between the KMT and the CCP, namely that there is only “one China,” without any “respective interpretations.”
The sad thing is that Ma still sees the so-called “1992 consensus,” which is centered on the idea of “one China,” as the foundation of a “bridge of peace.”
This “bridge of peace” is really a “bridge of sighs,” a one-way bridge to the afterlife. Once you cross it, you can never return.
Taiwan Affairs Office Minister Liu Jieyi (劉結一), who took up his post on March 19, comes from China’s diplomatic establishment, and as soon as he became minister, he started applying the fighting spirit of the diplomatic field to the “united front” system.
However, this is not a great change, because eradicating the ROC and opposing Taiwanese independence are the central aims of the office, and of China’s overall treatment of Taiwan. The ultimate aim is to turn Taiwan into a mere geographical name that has no implications of nationhood.
Beijing can be expected to keep coming up with new “favorable measures for Taiwanese,” but such “favors” are no more than a smokescreen for wiping out the ROC and Taiwan.
It is funny to see the pan-blue camp’s unification advocates applauding China for stepping up the pressure against Taiwanese independence. What they do not realize is that the first thing Beijing wants to get rid of is the ROC.
The first reason for that is that the ROC is a remnant of the Chinese Civil War that needs to be taken out of the way.
The second reason is that, from the point of view of preventing Taiwan from becoming an independent nation, eradicating the ROC can restrict the scope for imagination about a Taiwanese nation and turn Taiwan into a mere island without sovereignty.
Through the twin strategies of eradicating the ROC and “defeating any form of Taiwanese independence,” Beijing seeks to outflank Taiwan so that it can nibble away at it or even swallow it whole.
Taiwan’s government institutions also need to be considered, as do the terms they employ, from the “mainland area,” which appears in the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China (中華民國憲法增修條文), to the “mainland affairs” of the Mainland Affairs Council and the Straits Exchange Foundation, and other phrases such as “the two sides of the Strait,” “mainland China” and so on.
Administrative terms such as these have the effect of cementing people’s conflicting identities and giving the impression that “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait” really do “belong to one nation” and that preserving the nation’s independence is actually changing the “status quo.”
This institutional confusion has caused democracy and the rule of law to shrink back and legalize the words and deeds of unification advocates. It has led to scenes such as retired generals going to China to receive instructions from Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and unification supporters parading the PRC flag on the streets of Taiwan. Such behavior has come to be treated as freedoms that must be respected.
What can one say about this? To put it bluntly, this nation is becoming less and less worthy of the name. The contradiction between the ROC and Taiwan places democratic Taiwan in a state of civil war.
Denying and preventing the nationhood of the ROC and Taiwan has always been the objective of Beijing’s general offensive against Taiwanese, who now number 23.5 million.
If Taiwan arrives at the point of having zero diplomatic partners, as China hopes, that will indeed be the end of the ROC.
As to whether it will be the end of Taiwan, or mark a new beginning, that will depend on Taiwanese, and on the international community.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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