South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un are expected to hold a summit late next month, likely accompanied by more peace talks over the next few months, and US President Donald Trump could enter into historic talks at the end of May. These meetings are to have serious implications for the East Asia region.
Certainly, all eyes will be on Kim and Trump, as this will be the first such meeting between the leaders of the two nations, and it is difficult to know exactly how the leaders, both very unpredictable men, will interact in the run-up to the meeting and in the meeting itself.
Even though details have yet to be revealed, with the South Korean government acting as intermediary, the news is already having an effect on the region.
Based on the available information, the following five considerations apply:
First, it appears as though the situation on the Korean Peninsula has been exclusively handled by the two Koreas and the US.
Last year, Moon invited North Korean taekwondo athletes to attend the World Taekwondo Championship, which was followed by cooperation between the two Koreas at the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. Frequent high-level contact between the nations led to South Korean officials delivering a letter from Kim himself to Trump, and to Trump agreeing to a meeting with Kim.
Through all of this — on the surface at least — it appears as though Russia, China and Japan have not really played a part.
Second, if Kim has promised to refrain from carrying out further nuclear missile tests and to work toward the denuclearization of the peninsula, as Moon’s administration has reported, US forces stationed in South Korea would inevitably be reduced in number, while the US’ general military presence in Southeast Asia and all non-routine exercises would also decrease as a reciprocal gesture of goodwill.
If the US military must find a fictitious threat within East Asia to maintain and strengthen the rationale for its continued presence in the region, it might pivot to the East and South China seas.
At the same time, while friction between the US and China intensifies, other nations in the region — including Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam — have become caught up in the tussle as innocent bystanders and are forced to respond.
Third, whatever shape the Trump-Kim meeting takes, that Trump has agreed to a meeting suggests that Washington acknowledges North Korea is a (quasi-)nuclear state, despite the administration’s statements to the contrary — something that the wider international community might find difficult to believe.
The Trump administration’s strategy is perhaps more complex that it appears; nevertheless, Washington is still not forcing Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons, nor is it proposing a peace agreement to resolve the conflict.
Meanwhile, Pyongyang has been able to chalk up a significant diplomatic coup and could use a high-level summit with the US president as propaganda to justify its continued rule to its domestic audience.
However, if Pyongyang is simply stringing Washington along, in the short term it would be able to buy more time to carry out its nuclear research, which it is using as the primary tool to guarantee its national security.
Thwarting North Korea’s nuclear program and imposing sanctions on the regime must continue. If Pyongyang goes back on its word, the situation will at least not have gotten any worse.
Fourth, Moon is engaged in a political gamble. Political trust in Moon — both at home and abroad — is wholly reliant on Kim fulfilling his promise. If he goes back on his word, how will he explain this to Trump and deal with the reaction at home?
It is not clear the extent to which Beijing is in the loop on the latest developments. If Moon’s government did not inform China in advance, given that the path Moon is pursuing will have thrown into disarray Beijing’s use of North Korea as a political pawn, this might cause a breakdown in trust between China and South Korea, which could lead to conflict.
Finally, Washington’s commitment to the meeting might be questioned. The Trump administration has been demanding that its allies and other nations impose comprehensive sanctions and exert maximum pressure on North Korea. As a result, Pyongyang suddenly expressed its willingness to accept a meeting with Trump, despite not having publicly responded to the UN’s demands.
From the point of view of cooperating nations, since North Korea has not provided any verifiable evidence of its commitment to denuclearization, UN and US sanctions should continue.
For example, on the day that news broke of a Trump-Kim meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that he had already spoken to Trump on the telephone and said he would visit Washington next month. It might be that Abe is eager to ascertain the reason behind Trump’s sudden U-turn on North Korea and understand the potential risks to Japan.
Although the Trump-Kim meeting has yet to take place, it has already had an effect on regional politics and security.
If the meeting does not take place, or if it is downgraded to a video conference, telephone call, e-mail or even a greeting on Twitter or other social media — or if the meeting takes place, but does not go well — there would be no cause for alarm, since Trump and Kim are two peas in a pod: unpredictable attention seekers.
Huang Kwei-bo is a deputy director of National Chengchi University’s Department of Diplomacy and secretary-general of the Association of Foreign Relations.
Translated by Paul Cooper and Edward Jones
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