With the worsening situation of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, South Korean media are reporting that US President Donald Trump’s administration has made it known to China that, should it fail to exert pressure on Pyongyang, it will consider allowing Seoul and Tokyo to develop nuclear weapons.
The domino effect of this decision could even see Taiwan following suit, something China absolutely would not accept.
When Chang Hsien-yi (張憲義), former deputy director of the First Institute of the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), defected to the US in 1988, Taiwan was secretly developing nuclear weapons.
Had that incident happened in a Northeast Asia with possible nuclear proliferation, would the US still have stopped the program? Or would the US have tacitly allowed it, as it did with Israel, enabling Taiwan to boost its deterrence capability while lowering the US’ costs in preventing it from being taken by China?
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program appears to have progressed rapidly in a short time and there is a real possibility that it will soon be able to strike the US.
Several opinion polls of South Koreans show that more than 60 percent place little faith in the US’ nuclear umbrella, and actually support their country developing nuclear weapons.
The US is also concerned that a larger nuclear threat comes from China.
According to an official US report, within the next 15 years China could have more than 100 nuclear bombs capable of reaching the US. During the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, China let slip that it did not believe the US cared more about Taipei than about Los Angeles.
The Chang Hsien-yi incident occurred during the Cold War, when two considerations colored the US’ position.
First, the US did not believe China was capable of or willing to attack Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was weak, neither fully capable of troubling Taiwan nor dealing with the Soviet threat. It needed the US’ protection, albeit indirectly, and attacking Taiwan would have been against its own interests, as Beijing would not have wanted to risk offending the US.
Things are different now. Beijing is both capable and willing.
Second was concern over initiating a domino effect on nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia.
Even though the area was nuclear-free, each player — not just South and North Korea, Taiwan and Japan — could conceivably develop nuclear weapons within a short period.
Now, the first domino has already been tipped by North Korea and it is not only South Korea that is concerned.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said that Japan’s development of a small-scale defensive nuclear weapon would not contravene the nation’s pacifist constitution.
If all nations in Northeast Asia gained nuclear weapons, could the US oppose Taiwan joining in?
For Taiwan to rely solely on conventional weapons in the face of the PLA’s rapid development makes it increasingly difficult for us to protect ourselves from China. Many national defense ministers have said that Taiwan could only repel a PLA invasion attempt for between two and four weeks. What happens after that? Can it really rely on the US’ security assurances?
Opinion polls in the US show that fewer than 20 percent of Americans support going to war with China over Taiwan. On the other hand, the US is unlikely to be prepared to see China take Taiwan as its own.
For these reasons, the emerging situation might convince the US to tacitly agree to Taiwan boosting its own, independent deterrent.
Chen Shih-min is an associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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