As expected, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, Netherlands, ruled against China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Philippines was exultant. Beijing responded angrily.
Territorial disputes pose a perennial international problem. Great powers, including the US, typically refuse to be bound by the decisions of others when they believe important interests to be at stake.
The Asia-Pacific region offers particular challenges. The existing territorial and juridical order was established at a time when China was unable to effectively assert its claims or defend its territory. Understandably, Beijing is dissatisfied with the “status quo.”
Nor is Beijing the first rising power to challenge a system seemingly biased against it. The young US republic responded truculently in border disputes with both Great Britain and Mexico, even invading the latter and seizing half of that country.
In recent years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has challenged the territorial claims of Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, as well as physically augmented territories under its control and added military facilities, including airstrips.
Ironically, Taiwan shares many of the PRC’s claims.
The Philippines lacks an effective military and turned to the arbitration panel for support. The decision reaffirmed the position of the Philippines and nearby states, which will embolden them to take a tougher position against China.
Unsurprisingly, Beijing rejected the ruling and promised “to protect its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests.”
The PRC will also not be inclined to step back.
The US insists it takes no position in the ongoing disputes, but Washington has clashed with China over its right to collect intelligence. It would only take one drunk ship captain or one over-aggressive aircraft pilot to set the stage for conflict. If war erupted in the region, the US’ alliance with Japan and ambiguous commitment to Manila could drag the US into combat with nuclear-armed China.
All parties have an obligation to dampen tensions. They should start by recognizing that none of the disputed claims are worth war.
The resources in surrounding waters could be substantial, but would still pale compared with the cost of conflict. Joint development would yield most of the commercial gains without risking war.
In peacetime, navigation would continue largely unimpeded. In wartime, navigation would depend upon on the capabilities of the respective navies.
China’s claims might be extravagant, but it is in a position today to insist that they not be summarily dismissed, which explains why calls on the US to confront China are misguided.
The PRC’s stake in securing its coast is vital and the waters beyond substantial. The US’ interests are more diffuse and distant: Dominating China’s borders might be theoretically desirable, but is not necessary to protect US security.
Navigational freedom is important, but not directly threatened. Peaceful dispute resolution by others is welcome, but not obviously a matter for the US military.
Of course, there is a common presumption in Washington that the sight of a few US ships would deter aggressive action by China. Alas, the PRC is not likely to respond by abandoning interests viewed as essential.
Rather, it would do what the US almost certainly would do if similarly provoked: increase military outlays. This is a game the US cannot afford to win.
Although the US will remain wealthier and more powerful than China for years to come, Washington cannot forever afford to maintain military forces strong enough to have a reasonable certainty of defeating the PRC in Beijing’s home waters. Once the entitlement tsunami begins to overwhelm the federal budget, Americans are unlikely to back higher taxes to maintain the Philippine flag atop the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島) and Japanese control over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台), which are known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan. Taiwan also claims the formations. In contrast, Chinese would likely spend and risk whatever is necessary to ensure the disputed territories remain Chinese.
The best outcome for Washington would be for events to take their natural course, that is, the PRC’s neighbors rearm and coordinate to counter Beijing’s aggressiveness. The participation of both India and Japan would make a serious regional coalition possible.
Only mutually agreed solutions, not disputed legal rulings, can settle the region’s territorial disputes. In fact, the PRC peacefully resolved 17 of 23 previous border disputes.
Overall, the parties should “seek common ground while reserving differences,” as Wu Shicun (吳士存), the head of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies think tank, put it.
The US and its friends should demonstrate that China’s interests would be respected by adapting to changed circumstances.
The tribunal decision might prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Philippines and other interested states. However, no one in the region would benefit from further confrontation and possible war.
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He also served as a special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan.
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