The political fallout from the seizure of Pingtung County-registered fishing boat Tung Sheng Chi No. 16 by the Japan Coast Guard in disputed waters in the Western Pacific on April 24 has its roots in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by Japan on Sept. 8, 1951.
Clause 3 of the treaty says: “Japan will concur in any proposal of the US to the UN to place under its trusteeship system, with the US as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela [known as the Okinotori Islands in Japanese] and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the US will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.”
The treaty entrusted the Okinotori atoll to the administration of the US. The name for the island/atoll differs in the English and Japanese-language versions of the treaty. In English it is referred to as Parece Vela Island and in the Japanese version it is the Okinotori Islands. According to the final version of the original English-language agreement, when there is disagreement over interpretation of the treaty in Japanese, the English version would take precedent.
Furthermore, on April 28, 1952, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) signed the Treaty of Taipei with Japan, which reaffirmed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Despite this, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said that the matter should be resolved through international mediation. Since he cannot be ignorant of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, this could be an elaborate deception, designed to test the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the US and Japan and to deal a blow to the blueprint for regional peace created by late US secretary of state and co-author of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, John Foster Dulles, following the end of the Pacific War.
On April 27, three days after the seizure of the fishing boat, Ma convened the National Security Council. During the meeting, Ma announced the government’s three-point stance on the incident and instructed the Cabinet to adopt measures intended as a rebuke to Japan. On April 29, Ma unveiled a peace memorial on Kinmen Island. Throughout the series of events, Ma worked systematically to fabricate a false impression of peace.
Pan Chung-chiu (潘忠秋), the owner of the boat and the father of its captain, said that the vessel was about 150 nautical miles (278km) from the atoll and before setting off had confirmed its route with the Fisheries Agency and was told it could fish in the area. Despite that, the boat was intercepted, inspected and seized by Japanese authorities while in international waters.
If what Pan says is true, it is reasonable to infer that the Ma administration has tried to replicate the 1874 Mudan Incident, when 54 Ryukyuan sailors were massacred after becoming shipwrecked off the coast of Taiwan, which prompted Japan to send a naval force to Taiwan.
Following the incident, Japan took over the Ryukyu kingdom, while the latest incident has been an attempt to use Pingtung County’s Sialiociou Island (小琉球) to fabricate an incident to allow China to break through the first island chain and set up a situation where it can take over the sovereignty of Taiwan.
The fishermen of the Tung Sheng Chi No. 16 trusted the advice of the Fisheries Agency, but have instead become sacrificial pawns in Ma’s latest sell-off of the nation to China.
Koeh Ian-lim is a director at the Taiwanese Union of Teachers.
Translated by Edward Jones
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