It is surprising to see that, after the defeat in the presidential and legislative elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) chairperson by-election has turned into yet another battle between the party’s pro-local and pro-China factions. The battle for the party leadership — that KMT supporters think should not take place — has triggered a number of crises that have been latent in the party for many years. Whether spontaneous or induced, it seems that the party is gradually moving toward self-destruction.
Regardless of whether former deputy legislative speaker Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) or Acting KMT Chairperson Huang Min-hui (黃敏惠) is elected in the end, party integration is likely to be a difficult task. Although the participation of Legislator Apollo Chen (陳學聖) and Taipei City Councilor Lee Hsin (李新) in the by-election eases the tension, the KMT would have to deal with the following crises following the election and it would have to deal with them all at once.
First, the KMT’s political line is not clearly defined: In addition to the pro-local and the pro-China factions, there is the Grassroots Alliance formed by a group of younger KMT members, which has proposed six items of reform. How is the party going to integrate all these factions and avoid a split?
Second, the KMT is facing a dilemma over its cross-strait policy. Will President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and former vice president Lien Chan (連戰) meet with top Chinese leaders again? Given the influence of Ma and Lien, how will the next chairperson make use of the platform between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or redefine the party’s cross-strait policy? If a weak chairperson is elected, this could be an insoluble problem for the party.
Third, the KMT’s disorganized membership system and its Huang Fu-hsing (黃復興) military veterans’ chapter could affect the representativeness of party primaries.
Hung’s nomination as KMT presidential candidate in the party’s preliminary election with the chapter’s support exposed a huge gap between the Huang Fu-hsing chapter and the general voter structure. Now the same problem is once again appearing in the chairperson by-election. This is a problem that everyone finds unacceptable, but the KMT leadership has been unable to resolve it.
Fourth, the KMT’s competitiveness at the legislature has declined after many legislators failed to be re-elected. After many reputable and senior lawmakers were defeated — such as Ting Shou-chung (丁守中), Lin Yu-fang (林郁方), Sun Ta-chien (孫大千), Yang Li-huan (楊麗環) and Yang Chiung-ying (楊瓊瓔) — most of the party’s new lawmakers are local-oriented. How are they going to provide the strength that is expected of an opposition party and regain the confidence of the voters?
Fifth, the KMT suffers from a critical talent gap, and lacks a fair promotion system. The party lacks the internal decisionmaking and talent recruitment systems that a democratic party should have. This has resulted in a serious shortage of young talent and a Central Standing Committee that serves as a rubber stamp. Although this has been a target of criticism from members of the committee for many years, they have been unable to implement any changes.
Sixth, the KMT is incapable of formulating a discourse and setting a political agenda. Since Ma came to power in 2008, Presidential Office, Executive Yuan and party officials have been afraid of standing up for their policies. They have been incapable of defending their policies and have not understood how to respond to the challenges posed by new media. Discontent among supporters has continued to grow and many finally decided not to cast their ballots in last month’s crucial elections.
Seventh, the KMT is unable to lead the pan-blue camp and maintain its own supporter base. Neither Hung nor Huang is an A-list political superstar of national stature and neither have served as a member of the Cabinet. They also lack the charisma that is required for a leader of the entire pan-blue camp.
The KMT is faced with opposing political lines and aging personnel, its promotion of new talent is inappropriate and dominated by appointments of close aides, organization is loose and conviction has dissipated — the party is disconnected from the public and its grassroots organization is being hollowed out, its policy discourse is in a state of disarray and it has almost no effective propaganda channels.
Any one of these problems is enough to hurt a political party and the KMT is now suffering from all these problems at once, making it next to impossible to solve them all in the short term.
If the KMT collapses and is dissolved, the party only has itself to blame for sticking to old practices and resisting to reform. This is no reason for mourning, but there is still one issue that people need to pay attention to: If the KMT collapses in the same way that Chinese Youth Party and the China Democratic Socialist Party did in Taiwan, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would also have to bid farewell to the KMT-CCP civil war. The CCP would no longer have an adversary for continuing the so-called “peace talks on unification” act. This would deconstruct the current cross-strait relationship and that would have a significant impact.
The problem is that neither the ruling or opposition parties in Taiwan, or the authorities in Beijing, have prepared for such a drastic change because the KMT is collapsing at such breakneck speed.
Justin Chen is the vice president of the Cross-Strait Policy Association.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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