Taiwan’s cross-strait policies are convoluted. They can be roughly categorized into three aspects: general strategy; interaction strategy; and integrated consensus and policy execution. General strategy has to be formulated before it can guide cross-strait strategy and policy, which in turn can initiate domestic dialogue and build consensus that leads to policy execution.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has adopted a general cross-strait strategy of being pro-US, befriending Japan and making peace with China. Until tensions between Taiwan and China over sovereignty issues can be eased, Taiwan must befriend the US and Japan as it tries to make itself a strong nation that could withstand military and political pressure from China. Only then would Taiwan have sufficient security and bargaining power to begin negotiating with China.
At the same time, Taiwan must express goodwill and promote collaboration with China to develop a relationship that benefits both nations to diminish conflicts and promote cross-strait reconciliation, which is in line with the interests of Taiwan as well as international powers.
However, this strategy overlooks Taiwanese public opinion and society and Chinese public opinion and society. The result is that the strategy stands on shaky ground and cannot achieve what it sets out to accomplish.
The incoming government must strike a new strategic balance between Taiwanese public opinion, US interests, Japanese interests, Chinese public opinion and society, and the Chinese government.
A strategic balance is not merely a military balance, it is also a balance between all parties’ interests, strengths and feelings; ranging from the military, politics, economics, culture and national identity to domestic politics, cross-strait relations and international affairs.
A strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait means that cross-strait strategies have to sustain Taiwan’s economic prosperity, maintain the benefits gained through cross-strait exchanges and ensure the nation’s sovereignty, security and social justice, while maintaining its diplomatic relations and broadening its international engagement.
In the face of China’s emergence and growing strength and Taiwan’s economic problems, president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) would have to prioritize these important matters after taking office: achieving a consensus between the ruling and opposition parties and the public on cross-strait policies; establishing communication with the public on the matter; and ensuring transparency. Only by so doing will she be able to consolidate the nation’s power to conduct the negotiations and exchanges with China. It is the most important and the most urgent task; and perhaps also the most difficult.
Second, an effective general cross-strait strategy could rely on the US and Japan to oppose China. The US and Japan have their differences with China, but because of their close economic and trade relations, and the requirements of international collaboration, they maintain a relationship of latent enmity.
The US and Japan hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would be able to settle its disputes through peaceful dialogue on the basis of the so-called “status quo,” while hoping that Taiwan would support their interaction strategies with China, instead of creating friction between them and Beijing. Regardless of how high tensions get in Asia, a campaign to team up with the US and Japan to take on China is not going to be supported by Washington and Tokyo.
Third, Chinese society has recently become more open. Chinese can now access most information from around the globe through the Internet. Many Chinese are allowed to visit Taiwan. More importantly, Chinese public has formed a certain degree of restraining power on the Chinese government’s policies, even to the extent of having a direct impact on cross-strait exchanges. Hence, Taiwan’s incoming government should express goodwill toward Chinese and use appropriate means and channels to conduct communication and interaction, so that Chinese public opinion can serve as a positive force in developing cross-strait relations.
Taiwan must search for a new strategic balance in its cross-strait strategy: building domestic consensus, obtaining support from the US and Japan, uniting the Chinese public, acquiring understanding from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and affecting cross-strait reconciliation.
Only through domestic consensus would the government have the justification and support from the public to negotiate and interact with Beijing. Only with the support of the US and Japan would Taiwan have sufficient security and bargaining power to negotiate and interact with China.
Only by uniting the Chinese public would there be a societal foundation on which cross-strait tension can be reduced or defused. Moreover, it gives Taiwan more bargaining power to negotiate with the Chinese government. Only by gaining the CCP’s understanding would there be cross-strait dialogue and interaction that can lead to mutual trust, consensus and eventual cross-strait reconciliation.
Chen-yuan Tung is a visiting scholar at University of California, Berkeley. George Yin is a doctoral candidate at Harvard University.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
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