After 66 years of diplomatic estrangement, the Nov. 7 meeting between the leaders of Taiwan and China marked a moment of historical significance.
Global media coverage of the meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has been positive and of the opinion that the meeting has been beneficial to maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The Taiwanese side is still deciding how to respond to the Ma-Xi meeting. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has, with one voice, strongly criticized Ma for allowing the so-called “1992 consensus” to become a framework that is constraining Taiwan’s future. During the meeting, Ma neglected to mention the Republic of China (ROC) or make full reference to his government’s policy of “one China, each side with its own interpretation.” This is likely to have an impact on the nation’s current democratic Constitution, while also managing to deepen an international community impression that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to China.
The meeting has forced DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) — who had until then remained ambiguous on how she intends to “maintain the status quo” between Taiwan and China — to clearly state her position on the cross-strait relationship so as not to repeat her mistake from the 2012 presidential election. A Tsai-led government would seek to maintain Taiwan’s free and democratic way of life, while ensuring peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Further, Tsai said that cross-strait relations must be based on the principles of “reciprocity and dignity,” and “openness and transparency,” and be “free from political preconditions.”
This demonstrates that Tsai would be a different opponent for China’s leaders than Ma. If Beijing wishes to draw Taiwan closer into its fold, it must develop a new way of thinking and a new set of ideas.
The Ma-Xi meeting might have added to Ma’s prestige, but the political rewards are unlikely to trickle down to KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu (朱立倫), nor would they help to reverse the KMT’s declining electoral prospects. This is because there is a universal feeling of disappointment among Taiwanese for the way Ma has run his administration — his approval rating stands at less than 20 percent.
Tsai’s electoral prospects are positive, but if she cannot provide a satisfactory response to Beijing’s so-called “one China” principle, Taiwan’s current dependence on the Chinese market implies that a future Tsai administration would need both time and favorable conditions in order to spread risk between a wider number of markets; for example, by pushing for the new “go south” policy announced by Tsai in September, designed to strengthen relations with Southeast Asian countries and India. However, China’s leaders hold many of the cards, which would allow Beijing to put the thumb screws on a Tsai government.
For the purpose of balance, it should be stated that maintaining a stable relationship with China benefits Taiwan’s long-term development, while the future of Taiwan depends on the implementation of liberty and democracy. A domestic opinion poll conducted after the Ma-Xi meeting showed that 43.1 percent of respondents believe the meeting was beneficial to peaceful cross-strait relations, while as many as 58.6 percent said they would support regular meetings between the leaders of the two sides.
Although a majority of Taiwanese support the maintenance of stable relations between Taiwan and China, they do not support reunification. They also believe Taiwan should remain an open society and that Taiwanese should have the power to decide their future, and they are therefore unwilling to accept a “one China” principle that treats unification as a presupposed conclusion.
For this reason, if Tsai is elected president of the ROC, it is likely that she would still pursue Taiwanese sovereignty and independence in principle, while at the same time continuing to promote the development of peaceful cross-strait relations based on the ROC constitutional framework and her pledge to maintain the “status quo.” However, the nation would have to wait and see how such a policy is received by Xi.
Aside from feeling the impact of unfavorable global economic conditions, the key causes of a continued decline in Taiwanese exports over recent years have been a decline in the competitiveness of Taiwanese manufacturers, in addition to concerns over trade marginalization.
Taiwan has been unable to join both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, and it only has free trade agreements (FTAs) in place with eight countries. Trade with these countries accounts for 9.69 percent of Taiwan’s total trade volume.
In both quality and volume, Taiwan lags far behind its main competitor, South Korea, which has signed 49 FTAs. Trade from these countries accounts for 38.69 percent of South Korea’s total trade volume. This has caused Taiwanese manufacturers to feel that time is running out. They have therefore expressed a strong desire for the government to hold a second round of negotiations on joining the TPP.
As Taiwanese academics have said, as China — the world’s second-largest economy — is opposed to Taiwan signing FTAs with anyone other than the US, Taiwan has had many more failures than successes in this area. Therefore, aside from rebuilding the economy, and spreading market risk, the primary task of Taiwan’s future president would be how to resolve disputes and differences through further meetings between the leaders of the two nations, so as to avoid a rupture in their relationship.
Additionally, a future president must find a way to expand the space within which Taiwan can carry out international trade, while at the same time continuing to advance peaceful relations with China. After all, international trade is the lifeblood which Taiwan relies upon to exist and develop as a nation.
The Ma-Xi meeting might allow Taiwan to further its participation in the current trend toward economic integration within the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing can also benefit from various projects including its “One Belt, One Road” scheme, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the cross-strait trade in goods agreement and the plan to allow Taiwan to become a transit stop for Chinese passengers, to assist Taiwan in climbing out of its economic quagmire. It would also help to improve the attitude many Taiwanese have toward China, and perhaps even allow for an early realization of the dream of “one family on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.”
The Ma-Xi meeting has successfully built a bridge between the two sides. Whether the bridge’s foundations are strong, or whether it will eventually collapse into the water, is to be a test of the wisdom and farsightedness of the leaders of each nation — and be determined by the choice Taiwanese make at the ballot box. The result of January’s presidential election is likely to be an important turning point: May the gods bless Taiwan.
Du Yu is chief executive officer of the Chen-Li Task Force for Agricultural Reform.
Translated by Edward Jones
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