During his 12 years in office, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) tried to make both the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Republic of China (ROC) more Taiwanese.
A realist, Lee, who has a background as an agricultural economist, used the depth of his modern knowledge and training in combination with his political character to cautiously strive for change during his time as president at the jaws of the KMT.
The political friendship between Lee and his predecessor Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國), which remains unknown to outsiders, caused him to make plans both for Taiwan and for the KMT.
The KMT’s powerful elite did not appreciate the situation, and they in fact hated Lee with a vengeance, not because of the nation or the state, but because of their own personal interests.
For privileged party officials, politicians and soldiers that live like parasites off the KMT and its power, and the communities that refuse to settle down in Taiwan, the party-state in exile is the last thing of value that remains to them. Was it in accordance with their wishes that Lee took power after the two Chiangs? Was that acceptable to them?
In the 2000 presidential election, foolish, unsupportable former vice president Lien Chan (連戰) upset the logic of Lee’s transition of power.
On the one hand it was because of People First Party James Soong (宋楚瑜), who wanted it all, and on the other it was because the alien and fundamentally colonialist KMT did not believe that it should be led by Lee, a Taiwanese.
The KMT is about to become history, and its restoration during the eight years of Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) presidency have just been its last gasp.
After Lee handed power to his successor, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), on May 20, 2000, he stepped down as chairman of the KMT. At the time, the top Taiwanese-born party officials that could always be found in Lee’s entourage looked on as Lee’s giant shadow left the party, and most of them chose to stick with the party-state system that returned to its colonial roots.
Lien, who was the main reason why the KMT lost power, and Ma both followed their own schemes, as did Soong. This has led to the regression and reactionary backlash that has occurred 15 years into the 21st century as Lien, Ma and Soong have not only competed for power in Taiwan, but also made fools of themselves in China.
Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz, who lived in the US for a long time following World War II, wrote socially critical poetry. His poem Incantation — in his own translation — opens with the line, “Human reason is beautiful and invincible” and ends with the line, “Their enemies have delivered themselves to destruction,” as his beliefs finally bring him back home.
In the same way, an end will come to the KMT and its ROC as its fragmented remnants, fictitious existence and otherness come to an end.
Taiwan’s national identity will shine a new light of humanity as it rebuilds and reforms itself. The KMT will collapse and be buried together with its evil party-state.
Lee Min-yung is a poet.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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