In 2013, John Mearsheimer from the University of Chicago made a speech in Taipei, persuasively arguing that time is not on Taiwan’s side. As China becomes stronger and more powerful, the fate of Taiwan to maintain its independence is getting gloomy and dire. He concluded that a strong China is doomed to be a nightmare to Taiwan’s survival.
Reflecting on his insights, China’s military parade to celebrate the victory in World War II last week was deliberately choreographed to display its national strength as a great world power with daunting military forces externally, and to invoke and inspire the spirit of nationalism and patriotism internally, which might help dilute its domestic discontent and recent economic slowdown. Meanwhile, it also intends to signify the solid commanding power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the military.
While Taiwan’s media and politicians were bickering over the issues of whether the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) or the CCP led the war against Japan, or the appropriateness of former vice president Lien Chan’s (連戰) participation in the military parade, what truly matters for Taiwan’s survival is not actually the dispute over a remote historical event, nor some prominent politicians’ self-interested deeds.
What is more crucial to Taiwan’s interests are the possible fallout of the Chinese armed forces demonstration and its political implications in the context of geopolitical dynamics in East Asia.
From various perspectives, China’s muscle-flexing parade, showing off its cutting-edge weapons and belligerent forces, might induce more harm than good.
First, if China would like to take this opportunity to establish itself as a world power by portraying itself as a righteous victor of World War II, this objective has barely been achieved. Apart from Russia, virtually no leaders from the Allied nations attended this parade, suggesting that the CCP’s appeal to the world audience in terms of proclaiming its contribution in defeating the fascist camp has failed miserably.
Second, provided that Beijing would like to take this event as a demonstration of power to its troubling neighbors with heavyweight military sticks, in an attempt to mute them on the issue of territorial disputes, the result might be counterproductive and is likely to backfire.
That no leader from any state engaged in territorial disputes with China attended the parade to some extent has revealed these states’ political attitude toward Beijing. This implies that China’s military display was neither intimidating enough to compel them to participate in the event for considering the consequences of being otherwise, nor appealing enough to attract them to take part in this exhilarating and flamboyant victory celebration.
Even worse, Beijing’s presentation of military strength is likely to be perceived as a malicious and hostile gesture by its weak and small neighboring states and as a revisionist provocation by other regional powers.
Hence, the consequences of this military show-off might largely be interpreted as China’s offensive military assertiveness, which is likely to trigger a new wave of arms races in East Asia; to intensify rather than ameliorate existing tensions and to deepen rather than lessen the anxiety over the China threat.
Third, some critics have even argued that China’s jingoistic military rally, while boasting its most advanced military weapons, was also intended to deter other regional powers, such as the US, Japan and India, not to intervene in its sphere of influence.
If this was one of Beijing’s intentions, it might not merely fall short of its expectation, but is also likely to invite an unwanted backlash. First and foremost, despite the two-digit-percentage growth of China’s military budget and impressive weaponry advancement in recent years, the comprehensive combat capabilities required to defeat the US or to expel it from the region remain insufficient.
Moreover, the odds of Beijing achieving a decisive victory without suffering significant losses if it initiates wars against Japan or India seems implausible.
In other words, the expected deterrent effects of its military display might be insignificant. Nevertheless, Beijing’s saber-rattling could be perceived as an inflammatory action to revamp the “status quo” by regional powers. The worst scenario might elicit the formation of an anti-Chinese coalition, rather than gather more support abroad to recognize China as a benign regional hegemony.
As a result, it seems that the political implications of Beijing’s military display externally are inclined to generate more negative than positive outcomes. Nevertheless, as many political events in Chinese history have shown, the rationale of serving domestic needs always outweighs its implications abroad. From this perspective, one could comprehend China’s military show-off as a deliberately tailored show for boosting the prestige of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) as a global leader.
By initiating an anti- corruption campaign in the party, coupled with China’s recent economic turmoil, the exuberant military parade might have helped bolster Chinese confidence in the CCP as well as spread the important message that the core of the CCP decisionmaking circle remains staunchly in power and tightly controls the military.
Given that the CCP’s ruling legitimacy is largely hinged on economic growth and nationalism, with the sluggish Chinese economy and increasingly severe social conflicts, adroitly using a military parade as the means to incite a “rally around the flag” effect for boosting nationalist morale and patriotism certainly serves Beijing’s interests in diverting domestic discontent into a short-lived frenzy of nationalism.
After all, after being repeatedly imbued with China’s education system, which promotes the idea that China has suffered the “Hundred Years of Humiliation,” Chinese would be eager to see any demonstrating of its national pride and ascendancy.
What are the significant implications of this extravagant military show in regional geopolitics?
First, the charm of the Chinese economic boom has rarely drawn trustworthy friends into its camp. Despite many states being heavily dependent on the Chinese market, their leaders remained reluctant to attend the event, implying a sharp divide between economics and politics regarding their attitudes toward China.
Obviously, the current pattern of many states that rely on China economically, but that count on the US for security, is likely to maintain unchanged. While it remains difficult for Beijing to effectively employ its economic leverage for political goals, the glow of China’s economic appeal might gradually wane, especially after slow demand in the Chinese market and recent financial turbulence caused by its monetary policy.
Furthermore, after this parade, many states’ lofty expectations of China’s “one belt, one road” initiative might need to be re-examined. Since China is no longer a paper tiger without sharp claws, geopolitical risks along with business potential would be taken into account simultaneously. The lack of transparency in the Chinese political system and the vast uncertainty surrounding the Chinese economy might significantly raise the risk and trivialize expected gains.
Second, in terms of security, with its floating military assertiveness and its latest reclamation of disputed territory, Beijing is likely to announce an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea, which would pave the way for establishing a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine.
It is expected that China’s military aggression is bound to exacerbate regional instability in East Asia. An implicit coalition led by Washington and Tokyo with other states is likely to construct a defensive network to constrain any further move of China’s military projection.
Although it remains unknown whether any conflict could erupt due to misconceptions or poor judgement by either side, for the sake of Taiwan’s political survival, two policy implications deserve further consideration.
First, given that Taiwan already has excessive economic stakes in China, but enjoys scant political leeway, it has no choice but to adopt policies to reduce its economic dependence on China.
China’s recent economic turmoil has had a major impact on Taiwan’s exports, tourism and other industries. It is hard to imagine what the repercussions would be if Beijing decided to cut economic links with Taiwan.
For example, if Beijing suddenly suspended Chinese tourists coming to Taiwan, tourism would take a huge blow. Hence, diversifying export markets and lowering the nation’s economic reliance on China are imperative for safeguarding Taiwan’s economic security.
Second, given that most neighboring states are expected to beef up military expenditures as a countermeasure to address China’s military threat, Taiwan should also take this opportunity to further fortify its defense capabilities.
Most importantly, Taipei should enhance cooperation and coordination with allies in various fields, while not irritating but maintaining constructive engagements with Beijing.
If survival is a priority for Taiwan, it is critical and worthwhile for Taiwanese to devote efforts to minimize its vulnerabilities and magnify its asymmetrical strengths.
A strong China with territorial ambition is a nightmare for Taiwan, but a strong China, while prioritizing people’s free-will and well-being over nationalist rhetoric and the number of bayonets, would be a blessing for Taiwan.
Until that transformation comes, Taiwan needs to hold on with persistent determination and prudent strategies to confront China’s incoming challenge.
Eric Chiou is an assistant professor at National Chiao Tung University.
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