There is probably no other ruling party in the world that has such difficulties finding a presidential candidate as the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). There are no positive forces in the party with the power to direct internal affairs, but everyone seems to have the power to disrupt the primary process. The sum of these negative forces has resulted in the party’s inability to move forward.
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) might have been hoping that Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) would enter the race, but that was not acceptable to President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). Many KMT legislators and other members hoped that Chu would run, but he is unwilling to break a promise to complete his term as mayor of New Taipei City to fight a losing battle. Party heavyweights all have their own calculations, while Deputy Legislative Speaker Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) is the only person to register for the race in accordance with the KMT’s party charter.
However, many pan-blue supporters do not think much of her chances and feel she would also be unable to help boost the party’s prospects in the legislative elections. Hung also lacks the pull to bring in the electoral resources and political donations that are so important in an election.
Regardless of her chances, Hung is the party’s only candidate to gather the required number of supporting signatures. Now she must garner sufficient support in opinion polls.
KMT Vice Chairman Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), convener of the party’s election committee, established a one month period before the opinion polls were scheduled to allow for 10 policy information meetings to be held across Taiwan. However, only two days later, KMT Secretary-General Lee Shu-chuan (李四川) overruled Hau, saying that opinion polls would be held in 15 days and that there would only be one policy information meeting.
This raises the question about the use of such meetings. Opinion polls are supposed to canvas the general public, not Central Standing Committee members. The party clearly remains committed to indirect democracy and fears engaging with voters in a democratic manner.
There are to be two kinds of polls conducted, one gauging support for Hung and one comparing support for Hung with support for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), her party’s presidential candidate. The results of the first poll are to be given a 15 percent weighting and the second an 85 percent weighting. If Hung’s support rate is below 30 percent, her candidacy is to be thrown out and a “suitable” candidate drafted.
If the KMT resorts to a draft procedure, which means a return to closed-door politics, that would be a big blow to its transparency and democratization. It also raises the question of how the party could guarantee its draftee would be more likely to become president than Hung. It would only be fair to arrange opinion polls to gauge the support of the party’s choice, including a comparison of the support for Tsai and Hung.
As a result of the party’s apparent dislike of Hung there are many theories among observers as to why the KMT is trying to block her candidacy, and they are suggesting that the party abandon its attempts to manipulate the primary and proceed according to open democratic procedure to win the trust of both Hung and grassroots members.
If the KMT ends up initiating a procedure to draft another candidate, it would only raise further questions within the party and among voters, and worsen its prospects for January’s elections.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
RSS