The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are two big regional trade organizations working for integration in East Asia. Although Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating in both organizations, it has, for ideological reasons, been active only in respect to the RCEP, while taking a much more passive attitude toward TPP participation.
When President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) attempt in September 2013 to eliminate Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) failed, entry into the RCEP was made a part of the government’s policy to open up investment in China together with trade agreements for services and goods.
In February last year, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) told China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Minister Zhang Zhijun (張志軍) that the nation was eager to join the RCEP. At the time, China felt that Taiwan’s entry was not fully compatible with Beijing’s policy to promote unification with the nation through economic means and its “one China” policy, and it dodged the issue by saying that negotiations on the follow-up Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) had to be completed first.
In March last year, the Sunflower movement changed the situation. Its reaction to the service trade agreement and the policy to allow investments in China shocked Beijing. At the same time, it also showed the Ma administration that if it wanted the legislature to pass the service trade agreement, it would not be able to do so by going on the attack; the party would need a more refined strategy instead.
In July, Zhang visited Taiwan, and China abandoned its prior evasive behavior to offer a positive response. Beijing’s plan was to use the RCEP to ease anti-Chinese sentiment among the student-led Sunflower movement in an attempt to use the deal as a roundabout way to achieve the same result as if the service trade agreement had passed.
The Ma administration and Beijing clearly reached a new agreement on the service trade agreement and RCEP policies, and this could to a certain degree be seen as a concession on Beijing’s part, particularly since Taiwan’s accession to the RCEP would involve politically sensitive issues such as title and status. Still, there is no such thing as a free lunch: Beijing’s positive response contained a clever strategy aimed at achieving eventual unification and it is of the utmost urgency that Taiwanese are on the alert against this strategy and pay attention to future developments.
First, civic organizations and elected representatives must demand transparency in the talks between Wang and Zhang, with particular attention given to the Ma administration’s practical concessions or tacit acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) “one China” policy.
Second, the Ma administration will mobilize pro-Chinese media outlets and academics to stress the importance of regional economic integration, and link this to the agreements on trade in services and goods before selecting a time to push them through the legislature and complete the political and economic project that will seal eventual unification.
Third, if the legislature does not pass the agreements, or if the government feels that it would be difficult to do so, the Ma administration is likely to break them up and embed their key elements in the talks between RCEP member states so that cross-strait trade in services is instead included in that agreement.
Does Taiwan really need RCEP membership? Taiwan can sign free-trade agreements with the US, Japan and European countries, and it can join the TPP and sign any kind of goods and services trade agreements with ASEAN members.
What it must not do is sign the ECFA and the service trade agreement, nor join the RCEP.
Because Taiwan and China speak the same language and because they differ vastly in size and are neighbors, Beijing’s policy attraction will marginalize and lead to the colonization of Taiwan.
China’s influence in the RCEP continues to expand and Taiwan’s entry into the organization will only serve to speed up the nation’s marginalization, which runs counter to its attempts to increase its international participation.
Refusing the ECFA, the service trade agreement and the RCEP is the only way forward, if Taiwan wants to save itself and promote sustainable development.
Huang Tien-lin is former president and chairman of First Commercial Bank and a former Presidential Office adviser.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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