On Wednesday, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) confirmed the first case of H7N9 avian influenza in Taiwan when a 53-year-old businessman returning from Suzhou, China, was diagnosed with the virus.
Epidemic prevention experts have said they would not be surprised if instances of human-to-human transmission of the virus begin to emerge.
To avoid an epidemic and the severe consequences that would follow, it is of the utmost urgency that the nation initiate outbreak prevention measures.
Here are three suggestions on how an epidemic prevention system could be devised and made operational:
First, it is necessary to have a comprehensive grasp of all epidemic prevention information.
It is likely that the CDC is the agency which has the quickest access to the best information.
However, the agency may be hindered by four blind spots:
It will not know immediately when a Taiwanese in China infected with H7N9 leaves for Taiwan; it will not know when and where in Taiwan it will be confirmed that that person carries the virus; there is uncertainty as to whether medical institutions have the ability to report epidemic-relevant information in the quickest way possible; and it is uncertain if the CDC will be able to inform the whole bureaucratic apparatus — in particular the epidemic prevention system and its top bureaucrats — about the status of an outbreak, its seriousness and its consequences in the most time-efficient way.
Given these blind spots, it is uncertain whether it will be possible to gain a comprehensive grasp of all epidemic prevention information.
Second, it is necessary to fully mobilize all epidemic prevention resources.
Having a complete grasp of epidemic information is a prerequisite for the effective and correct mobilization of preventative resources.
There are four issues regarding whether the full mobilization of those resources will result in the authorities gaining complete control over the situation: The CDC may not have complete resource information, or it may have failed to conduct a detailed inventory of resources, and even if the centers have a resource inventory it will not necessarily be able to mobilize those resources.
For example, the Bureau of Health Promotion is on an equal footing to the CDC, so it is not an absolute certainty that the centers will be able to effectively mobilize the bureau.
Also, not all epidemic prevention resources are under CDC control, there are also government and privately run medical institutions, and a public health system divided between national and local governments which means that for political reasons, cooperation may not be entirely without problems.
Finally, since the current outbreak originated in China, there are questions as to whether the cross-strait political situation will affect the effectiveness of the mobilization of epidemic prevention resources between the two sides.
The third factor necessary for the implementation of an epidemic prevention system is the full mobilization of the administrative system.
The general administrative system is bigger than the medical or public healthcare systems. If an epidemic spreads and becomes very serious, it will become necessary to mobilize the entire administrative system to contain an outbreak in the same way that it is mobilized when a natural disaster occurs.
The complete mobilization of the administrative system may involve inter-ministerial, cross-agency, cross-level and interdisciplinary issues.
Imposing a ban on the slaughter of chickens, managing the nation’s borders and issuing travel warnings are all important measures. However, regardless of how the administrative system is mobilized, it could run into cooperation or integration difficulties due to the character of an agency or its organizational culture.
The Cabinet has set up a disaster prevention and protection office so that when a disaster occurs, it can play a integral role.
The problem is that neither the CDC nor the Department of Health may be familiar with the platform for integrating disaster prevention and protection, which could cause blind spots when fully mobilizing the administrative system.
Adding considerations about private sector or community epidemic prevention systems, the situation becomes even more complicated.
The nation’s epidemic prevention system should be fully prepared to deal with a possible spread of the H7N9 virus.
It is not the responsibility of the CDC alone, but also of the government and the public.
The government controls more information and resources than any other entity, so it should have a comprehensive response and mobilization plan for dealing with any outbreak.
In addition, to keep the public constantly informed of the latest information about an epidemic, it should provide clear explanations of the situation so that the public is able to gain a thorough understanding of the problems and difficulties in epidemic prevention.
This is the only way to obtain the public’s participation in containing an outbreak.
Yang Yung-nane is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Political Economy and the director of the Research Center of Science and Technology Governance at National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with