On the eve of the Republic of China’s (ROC) Double Ten National Day centennial celebrations, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) offered her definition of the nation’s status, saying that “Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan.” In response, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said: “The ROC is our country, and Taiwan is our home,” as if in a deliberate attempt to point out that the ROC is not Taiwan.
However, in an interview on Friday last week, Ma came up with a slightly different phrasing, saying: “When we mention Taiwan, it means the ROC.”
The presidential candidates should agree that Taiwan is the ROC and the ROC is Taiwan and build on this “Taiwan consensus” to unify the nation and resolve the challenges posed by the rise of China and globalization.
After 62 years in Taiwan and the historical development of democratic reform, the ROC is Taiwan, rather than pre-1949 China. The ROC’s territorial jurisdiction only extends to Taiwan proper, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, or “Taiwan” for short. There are only 23 million people in the ROC, and the sovereignty of the ROC rests with them and no one else. Today, the view that Taiwan is the ROC and that the ROC is Taiwan has long been generally acknowledged, and it is broadly accepted by both the Taiwanese and the international community.
The US’ Taiwan Relations Act states: “The term ‘Taiwan’ includes the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores [Penghu], the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the US as the ROC prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.”
After Taiwan’s democratization and introduction of direct presidential elections, the DPP’s Resolution on Taiwan’s Future of 1999 stated that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state and that its national title is the ROC. This is the DPP’s affirmation of the current situation that “Taiwan is the ROC.” However, it is even more important to realize that through the process of democratization the ROC government has been legitimized and authorized by the Taiwanese people, and it is therefore not necessary to change the national title in order to uphold sovereignty and democracy. In addition, any changes to Taiwan’s political status and national title can only be made with the approval of Taiwanese. This is a core democratic value.
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) also supports this line of reasoning. Regarding the referendum on joining the UN and other international organizations before the 2008 presidential election, the KMT publicly said that “Taiwan meant ‘the ROC.’”
During his 2008 presidential campaign, Ma repeatedly said that Taiwan is a sovereign state, that Taiwan is the ROC and that he was running for president of both the ROC and Taiwan. When Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛) attended a legislative -question-and-answer session for the first time as Mainland Affairs Council minister, she also said “the ROC and the People’s Republic of China have no jurisdiction over each other. The ROC is a sovereign and independent state; Taiwan is a sovereign and independent state.”
Three recent opinion polls show that Taiwanese have reached a high degree of consensus on this view of the nation’s status. According to a DPP poll, 72 percent of respondents agreed with the view that “Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan,” while only 18 percent disagreed. According to a NOWnews poll, 68.9 percent agreed and 19.2 percent disagreed with the same statement. Finally, according to a China Times poll, 50 percent of respondents agreed, while 18 percent disagreed. In other words, a majority of Taiwanese identify with this definition of the nation’s status.
As such, we should not juxtapose the ROC and Taiwan or accuse Tsai of leaning toward the ROC. She is actually leaning toward both the ROC and Taiwan at the same time to build stable majority support for a “Taiwan consensus.”
Tsai’s “Taiwan consensus” — that “Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan” — could attract swing voters and maybe even bridge the gap to the pan-blue camp and attract light-blue supporters.
According to a NOWnews poll, after Tsai proposed her view of the nation’s status, 56.7 percent of swing voters and 43.1 percent of pan-blue supporters did not believe her election would lead to any serious regression in cross-strait relations. In comparison, Ma’s claim that “one China” refers to the ROC has caused much doubt among both pan-blue and pan-green supporters, as well as among swing voters: 23.3 percent of pan-blue supporters, 35.5 percent of pan-green supporters and 18.4 percent of swing voters believe Ma would push for unification if re-elected.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor at National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Eddy Chang
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with