“One China, two governments” was recently suggested by Chu Shulong (楚樹龍), deputy director of the Institute of International Strategic and Development Studies at Tsinghua University in Beijing, as an alternative framework for cross-strait relations. China has not responded to his idea. In Taiwan, meanwhile, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) did respond, and with a degree of urgency, saying that the concept was open to discussion.
The idea of “one China, two governments,” if accepted, would overturn the so-called “1992 consensus,” a concept that was essentially fabricated anyway. As such, the new suggestion is a slap in the face for Ma. It is funny he never considered the “1992 consensus” open for discussion.
The biggest difference between Chu’s idea and the “1992 consensus” is that the reason Ma keeps banging on about the latter is to maintain the sole, and non-negotiable, precondition for cross-strait negotiations. He has said that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) should not abandon the “consensus” even if it wins the next presidential election. In “one country, two governments,” China now has another argument, demonstrating that the “1992 consensus” is not set in stone after all, and that it can be replaced. Indeed, if “one country, two governments” did become official Chinese policy, Ma’s “consensus” would quickly become obsolete.
Chu’s idea is but one way in which China and Taiwan could proceed. Whether it is workable, or whether it could actually succeed, is beside the point. What is important is the train of thought that led Chu to his conclusion.
He says that if China and Taiwan want to maintain relatively long-term and stable relations, they need to reach a bilateral agreement and establish an appropriate framework. According to Chu, the current formulations, the “1992 consensus” and even “one China, with each side having its own interpretation,” are interpreted differently by each side, and either side could conceivably unilaterally change the situation at any time.
He certainly has a point. Precisely because the “1992 consensus” is a fabrication, the idea of “one China” that rests on it remains open to interpretation. If the “consensus” really is as Ma says it is, and that documentation exists, then there must have been a formal agreement at one point. And if this is the case, how can one maintain that any part of it is open to interpretation, or that Chu has a leg to stand on in his argument?
Ma berates DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) for not recognizing the “1992 consensus,” saying that she is not facing up to reality. That is your reality, Ma, and it is a bubble recently burst by a Chinese academic. The “1992 consensus” has been held up as some kind of principle that can be used to neutralize the pro--independence movement and facilitate eventual unification, but now it has been exposed for the fake it is. Even the Chinese-language United Daily News, considered to be a deep-blue newspaper, has had to adjust its position on the matter.
Until recently, the newpaper has consistently attacked Tsai over her position on the “consensus,” its main point being that the DPP has nothing else to offer Taiwan if it denies the “1992 consensus.” Now that an alternative, the “one China, two governments” idea has appeared on the scene, the paper has changed its tune, saying that there is no need to hide behind the rather vague “1992 consensus.”
The United Daily News itself concedes that the “1992 consensus” is vague, and admits that the reason behind it is to obfuscate the issue. What more needs to be said?
Chin Heng-wei is editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly.
TRANSLATED BY PAUL COOPER
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