Since the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), the national defense budget has plummeted. Taiwan’s arsenal is aging and defense capabilities are weakening, while China is spending more than 10 percent of its annual budget on defense every year. The cross-strait military imbalance is a clear concern for many countries, with even US and Japanese military experts shaking their heads in disbelief.
A cable from the US embassy in Bangkok recently released by WikiLeaks shows that former minister of foreign affairs Francisco Ou (歐鴻鍊), in a conversation with AIT Chairman Raymond Burghardt on March 20, 2009, said that the Ma administration would make three commitments to the US: Taiwan would not request that the US sell specific weapons systems to Taiwan simply to prove that the US would do so; Taiwan would not request any special transit arrangements just to show that the US supports Taiwan, and Taiwan would not insist on the use of specific names based on political concerns.
The cable answers many questions. The Ma administration never intended to ask the US for advanced weapons; it has pinned its national security strategy on reconciliation with China — so long as Beijing does not attack Taiwan, it does not matter if this nation’s weapons are out of date because they will never be used anyway.
Peace talks are indeed one way to protect national security, but unilaterally suing for peace will, in the short run, only create a sense of false security and the mistaken impression that the current peaceful situation is sustainable. Unfortunately, the current reality is not necessarily so rosy. If China were dissatisfied with the progress of its unification attempts and decided to turn to a military solution, where would Taiwan turn for security if its military proved incapable of defending against even the first attack? The government’s blind pro-China policy is a sugarcoated poison pill.
The government might say in its own defense that Ma has called on the US to sell Taiwan F16C/D aircraft on several occasions, and that he did so again when meeting with Richard Bush, director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brooking Institution, on Wednesday.
However, Taiwan has been urging the US to sell fighter jets for seven years. The previous Democratic Progressive Party administration asked for a price quote three times without receiving a response. Ma blamed the US for his decision to refrain from asking for a price quote, implying that the US did not want Taiwan to ask for a quote.
Another look at the cable, however, shows the Ma administration’s requests were just feints to convince the public that the government feels strongly about national defense and to convince US experts and academics that Taiwan has not given up on self defense and will not join China, showing that there is no need for the US to change its view of Taiwan as an ally.
China has more than 1,000 missiles aimed at Taiwan, Taiwan is within reach of Chinese fighter jets and China’s first aircraft carrier is about to go into service. Regardless of whether a strong military is a defense necessity or a backup force in case peace talks go wrong, Taiwan is in urgent need of advanced weapons. As commander-in-chief responsible for the lives, property and safety of 23 million Taiwanese, Ma must understand that national security is not about talking big, but walking small.
George Santayana wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” This article will help readers avoid repeating mistakes by examining four examples from the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces and the Republic of China (ROC) forces that involved two city sieges and two island invasions. The city sieges compared are Changchun (May to October 1948) and Beiping (November 1948 to January 1949, renamed Beijing after its capture), and attempts to invade Kinmen (October 1949) and Hainan (April 1950). Comparing and contrasting these examples, we can learn how Taiwan may prevent a war with
A recent trio of opinion articles in this newspaper reflects the growing anxiety surrounding Washington’s reported request for Taiwan to shift up to 50 percent of its semiconductor production abroad — a process likely to take 10 years, even under the most serious and coordinated effort. Simon H. Tang (湯先鈍) issued a sharp warning (“US trade threatens silicon shield,” Oct. 4, page 8), calling the move a threat to Taiwan’s “silicon shield,” which he argues deters aggression by making Taiwan indispensable. On the same day, Hsiao Hsi-huei (蕭錫惠) (“Responding to US semiconductor policy shift,” Oct. 4, page 8) focused on
Taiwan is rapidly accelerating toward becoming a “super-aged society” — moving at one of the fastest rates globally — with the proportion of elderly people in the population sharply rising. While the demographic shift of “fewer births than deaths” is no longer an anomaly, the nation’s legal framework and social customs appear stuck in the last century. Without adjustments, incidents like last month’s viral kicking incident on the Taipei MRT involving a 73-year-old woman would continue to proliferate, sowing seeds of generational distrust and conflict. The Senior Citizens Welfare Act (老人福利法), originally enacted in 1980 and revised multiple times, positions older
Nvidia Corp’s plan to build its new headquarters at the Beitou Shilin Science Park’s T17 and T18 plots has stalled over a land rights dispute, prompting the Taipei City Government to propose the T12 plot as an alternative. The city government has also increased pressure on Shin Kong Life Insurance Co, which holds the development rights for the T17 and T18 plots. The proposal is the latest by the city government over the past few months — and part of an ongoing negotiation strategy between the two sides. Whether Shin Kong Life Insurance backs down might be the key factor
RSS