The open letter to President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) administration first published in Chinese on April 10 and in English on April 11 and signed by 34 academics and officials was met with a mix of strong language, snide comments and attempts at professional assassination by the Ma administration. Although much has been said recently about the KMT sounding increasingly like its once-arch nemesis, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), especially in its handling of Taiwan’s sovereignty, it might be of some interest to examine how both the KMT and CCP have in the past, and continue to this day, to meddle in the internal affairs of another nation — the US.
Forget the fact that the KMT and CCP now evidently share the same statistical bureau and are thus, meddling in each other’s internal affairs — unless, of course they already share the same internal affairs bureau and therefore, the same internal affairs.
Both the CCP and the KMT have for decades blatantly interfered in US domestic politics.
First, there is the example of the CCP with its continuous and evermore strident protests when Washington decides to sell arms to Taiwan. Forget that the US has promised to gradually reduce such sales to Taiwan.
As former US president Ronald Reagan said: “The People’s Republic has agreed that they are going to try and peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue. We, in turn, linked our statement about [gradual reductions in sales of] weaponry to that and said that if they make progress and do, indeed, peacefully work out a solution agreeable to both sides, then, obviously, there would no longer be any need for arms.”
It is because Beijing refuses to renounce the use of force in solving the “Taiwan issue” that weapons sales have continued.
However, more important than Washington’s agreement to gradually reduce arms sales if the “Taiwan issue” was resolved peacefully is the fact that every time the People’s Republic of China (PRC) protests US arms sales to Taiwan, it is blatantly interfering in US domestic political affairs.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of April 10, 1979, is a US law enacted by the US Congress, requiring the US government to “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” and to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
What this means is that the PRC has been directly interfering in US domestic political affairs for more than 30 years.
Second, with regard to the Republic of China (ROC) and its own recent protest in response to the academics’ open letter, we should perhaps take a look at the ROC’s own meddling in US internal affairs. It is no secret that for decades the ROC has been lobbying Congress for support, as well as arms.
What is more, as Richard Bush said in his 2004 book At Cross Purposes: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1942, one of the reasons why the KMT decided to suffer a democratic system with an at times loud and unruly opposition was due to the fact that the ROC was faced with a major crisis of legitimacy in the late 1970s as its closest and most powerful ally, the US, withdrew its official recognition.
To be sure, a combination of lobbying US lawmakers and democratizing Taiwan has helped the ROC regain the attention and respect of many government officials and private US citizens long after China surpassed Taiwan as a US economic partner.
Taiwan is still of course quite important strategically to the US and remains an economic partner of the US, but as China continues its rise and kicks up an evermore bellicose fuss over arms sales, some academics and officials in the US have once again begun asking whether relations with Taiwan are a liability.
The best thing the Ma administration can do is to accept criticism and reply politely to inquiries regarding the status of Taiwan’s democracy. Telling foreigners to butt out, calling them ignorant fools and making ridiculous statements regarding the health of several of the signatories is not only childish, anti-democratic and inaccurate — but also extremely PRC-like.
US lawmakers first started asking why the US should support what was then known as “Free China” (Taiwan) as the PRC launched its reform and opening program, back in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Indeed, as the no-longer totalitarian, but still--authoritarian PRC, began to resemble “Free China,” lobbyists from the long-time authoritarian ROC, directly interfered in the workings of the US government in order to maintain support for their country.
Democratization in Taiwan helped to retain US support, but one has to ask the question: As the PRC and ROC start to increasingly resemble one another, might the US conclude that Taiwan is a liability? It is not enough that one regime interferes in the US’ internal affairs every time the US does something it doesn’t like. Now even a once-friendly regime, snaps at anything that it doesn’t like.
However, the Ma administration has another choice, and that is to stop lobbying the US Congress. Forget about arms sales. Forget about US support. Forget about exchanges. Forget about security agreements, no matter how ambiguous. Throw in your lot with another authoritarian big mouth. That’s the other option.
The Ma administration has a simple choice: put up or shut up. Put up with simple inquiries from foreign experts and maintain your ability to lobby the US Congress or shut up: Put your money where your mouth is and leave US domestic affairs alone as well. It’s that simple.
What I and many people I have talked to in Taiwan have concluded as we have observed the Ma government go about its business over these past three plus years is that the president and his administration have already chosen option No. 2. All that is left is a public announcement to that effect.
Perhaps that is the real significance of the Ma administration’s response to the open letter.
Nathan Novak studies cross-strait relations at National Sun Yat-sen University.
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