The Philippines deported 14 Taiwanese fraud suspects to China, on the latter’s request. This has set a precedent that may well have dire consequences.
The extradition of suspects is a very serious and complex legal and political process that involves both sovereignty and jurisdiction. What generally happens is that the legality of an extradition request is determined by the courts before the executive branch makes a political decision.
Article 21 of Taiwan’s Extradition Act (引渡法) states that after a resolution is made by the court, the case must be submitted to the president for confirmation. Clearly, extraditions are to be taken very seriously. So why did the Philippines act in so cursory a manner here?
First, the Philippine presidential office said that it deported the Taiwanese in line with the “one China” policy. It would be good if Taiwan’s government could tell the public whether China had identified the 14 suspects as Chinese or Taiwanese when it made the extradition request. Why would the Philippines have specifically mentioned the “one China” policy had Beijing not insisted that Taiwan is a part of China, meaning that Taiwanese are to be seen as Chinese?
Allowing China to extend its jurisdiction unhampered really is a serious dereliction of duty on the part of our government.
From a legal perspective, Taiwan, China and the Philippines all have so-called jurisdiction in this particular case, in what is called “concurrence of jurisdiction.” The Philippines has “territorial jurisdiction” because the crime was committed on its soil. Taiwan has “nationality jurisdiction” over 14 of the 24 suspects concerned and China could claim “passive personality jurisdiction” or the “protective principle of jurisdiction” because its own nationals were the victims of the crime.
According to international practice, the Philippines’ territorial jurisdiction gets priority in such competitive jurisdiction, followed by Taiwan’s nationality jurisdiction. China’s case for extradition, based on the principles of either passive personality or the protective principle, is relatively tenuous.
It is generally accepted that a nation’s criminal code does not apply extraterritorially, and the protective principle of jurisdiction is usually limited to serious crimes involving national security or other matters involving vital national interests.
Let’s look at the significance of international treaties on extraditions, and how such matters actually transpire in practice. The Philippines is in no way obliged to act on China’s request for the extradition of the nationals of a third country, in this case Taiwan. Taiwan has not signed an extradition treaty with the Philippines, so the latter has no legal obligation to hand over criminals to Taiwan in international law, either. That is the legal side.
International practice does suggest, however, that the Philippines should at the very least have given Taiwan some form of official notification regarding China’s request, based on the principle of international comity. It might have solicited our consent, or invited us to participate in the extradition process, so as to ensure the interests of the suspects were protected.
In its handling of this matter the Philippines has not only failed to give Taiwan procedural justice, it has also failed to take into consideration the fact that China, given the situation in that country vis-a-vis human rights and the rule of law, is perhaps not the most appropriate venue to send the nationals of a third country for trial.
There is also something rather skewed about its invocation of the “one China” principle, suggesting that China and Taiwan sort it out between them, as if we don’t know how that is going to end. It all highlights that Taiwan is at a loss when it comes to dealing with issues involving its sovereignty and international law.
When it came to Taiwan’s attention that China had requested the extradition in accordance with the extradition treaty signed between Beijing and Manila, the government should have immediately asked the Philippines to hand our nationals back to us, in accordance with the principle of international comity, so that they could be prosecuted according to the law here. This would have established the legal basis for conducting bilateral negotiations on the issue. There is no need to do these things under the table.
I have read, with considerable exasperation, several newspaper articles over the last few days, either arguing that this case has nothing to do with sovereignty, or talking about judicial cooperation between Taiwan and China. China sent a special charter flight to take its “Taiwanese compatriots” back home along with the 10 Chinese suspects, amid great fanfare. How is this nothing to do with sovereignty?
As far as judicial cooperation is concerned, there have been enough felons guilty of serious criminal and economic offenses fleeing to China, where they find themselves as free as the proverbial bird, to render such judicial agreements worth little more than the paper they are written on. If we are to have a cross-strait agreement to fight crime, would it be too much to ask for these criminals to be repatriated to Taiwan, and then to negotiate terms for an exchange of criminals that would suit both sides?
As it stands at the moment, the overriding impression one gets from the way this affair has unfolded is that Taiwan has to go through China in its dealings with other countries. Through its own handling of the matter, the government has revealed itself to be disorientated, lurching and sluggish. To say this is disconcerting is somewhat of an understatement.
Chen Rong-jye is a professor of law and a former secretary-general of the Straits Exchange Foundation.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG AND PAUL COOPER
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with