When the dust settled after Saturday’s elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) emerged as the winner in Taipei City, Sinbei City and Greater Taichung, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) came out on top in Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan. Although, at first glance it appears that very little changed, a closer look reveals that while the KMT may not have lost face, it did lose the real battle by garnering fewer votes than the DPP.
These elections attracted a lot of attention in part because they were widely considered to be a prelude to the 2012 presidential election. Had the KMT lost even one of the three areas it now holds, party morale would have dropped while the DPP’s morale would have soared.
Both parties and maybe even China saw the elections as a litmus test on the popularity of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) cross-strait policies.
If that is true, then the status quo is hardly a positive verdict. Crucially, the DPP’s share of the overall vote increased to 49.87 percent while the KMT’s fell to 44.54 percent. If Saturday’s election had been for the president, Ma would have been kicked out of office because half of all Taiwanese voters are apparently disappointed with his performance. That is the main lesson to take away from Saturday’s elections.
In addition, the DPP enjoyed landslide victories in Greater Kaohsiung and Greater Tainan, while only losing Greater Taichung by 32,000 votes — clear evidence that the KMT’s power is waning. If the unfortunate shooting of Sean Lien (連勝文) on Friday night had not prompted more KMT supporters to head to the polling booths, pushing voter turnout from about 65 percent in previous elections to 71 percent this time, the KMT would probably have received even fewer votes and maybe even lost one of its cities.
Taichung Mayor Jason Hu (胡志強) was the runaway pre-election favorite for Greater Taichung, but in the end he only just squeaked past DPP candidate, Su Chia-chyuan (蘇嘉全). In the 2008 presidential election, Ma carried Taichung by about 300,000 votes, of which only 30,000 remain.
In Sinbei City, Eric Chu (朱立倫) defeated DPP Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) by about 110,000 votes although Ma carried Taipei County by 490,000 votes in 2008. These massive changes imply that Ma could face an uphill battle in the 2012 elections.
Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) was lucky to win re-election by 170,000 votes, given accusations of irregularities related to the Taipei International Flora Expo and the Xinsheng Overpass project and negative opinion polls. Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu defeated independent candidate Yang Chiu-hsing (楊秋興) and KMT Legislator Huang Chao-shun (黃昭順) in the Greater Kaohsiung election by garnering about 53 percent of the vote. In Greater Tainan, the DPP’s William Lai (賴清德) was never threatened by KMT candidate Kuo Tain-tsair (郭添財), showing that the DPP continues to gain strength in the south.
In addition to Friday night’s shooting, other reasons the KMT held on to its three cities include the relaxed cross-strait atmosphere, the reviving economy, the government’s many promises and the fact that several countries have recently granted Taiwan visa-exempt status.
However, the KMT should be concerned that many people feel the new cross-strait atmosphere has come at the expense of national sovereignty, that the economic revival only benefits an already wealthy minority and that while unemployment figures are dropping, the quality of jobs on offer is deteriorating and salaries are very low, leaving people with a sense of relative deprivation.
Saturday’s elections highlight the ineptness of Ma’s administration and increasing public dissatisfaction with it, factors that should worry Ma.
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