People in Taiwan have long seemed to be tangled in a web of issues pertaining to historical origins, differentiating one another with labels such as wai-shengren (外省人) — Mainlanders who fled from China with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) after 1949 — or the benshengren (本省人), those who came to Taiwan from China centuries ago. Recent reports on the outpouring of love and care for Chin Heng-wei (金恆煒), however, have debunked claims that a “provincial complex” (省籍情結) divides the people in this country.
A fundraiser was held last week for Chin, a political commentator known for his outspoken pro--Taiwan independence stance. The fundraiser was initiated as a means to help Chin, who is embroiled in financial difficulties because of multiple lawsuits against him. The financial burden is expected to take a bigger toll on him following his diagnosis with pancreatic cancer in August.
Little did the fundraiser organizers know that they were in for a jaw-dropping success. Within one week, more than NT$23 million (US$744,000) was raised, well beyond the initial objective of NT$5 million.
The remarkable sum that was gathered within such a short period surely comes as heartwarming news and a testimony to Taiwanese benevolence.
That the majority of the sum came in the form of small donations by members of the public further demonstrated that many people, at least among pan-green supporters, have moved beyond the “provincial complex,” dashing the purported ethnic barriers.
Chin fits well in the category of so-called wai-shengren, having been born in Zhejiang Province and speaking hardly a word of Hoklo (commonly known as Taiwanese).
That, however, has not stopped the pan-greens, characterized by their pro-independence stance, from embracing Chin and extending a helping hand.
It’s no secret that whenever elections roll around, some politicians are quick to play the “provincial” or “ethnic” card, using it as a campaign tool to manipulate tensions in their favor.
The successful fundraising efforts for Chin has demonstrated that the labels waishengren and benshengren no longer play a significant role among the pan-green electorate. As suggested by Chin’s case, it doesn’t matter if one is a waishengren or ben-shengren; so long as people manifest love for Taiwan through deeds, they are embraced by the pan-greens as Taiwanese.
It subsequently came to many a mind that in October 2007, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), then the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate, also proclaimed his devotion to Taiwan.
Citing a speech by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in a talk about Taiwanese identity, Ma, alluding to Sarkozy’s remark that “What makes us French is not only that we were born in France but also that we choose to stay in France,” also touted his love for Taiwan.
Two years into his presidency, however, Ma still questions why the opposition often doubts his stance and attachment to Taiwan.
Ma is well advised to look at Chin and learn a thing or two, for the president’s profession of love for this country counts for very little when such rhetoric comes only when election time rolls around.
The Chin story is a soothing and encouraging example that ethnic identification is melting away among the public. One can only hope that politicians could arrive at such a conclusion as well.
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