Life after Kyoto
As the expiration date for the Kyoto Protocol looms ever closer, environmentalists like George Monbiot will predictably pin much of the blame for the failure of Kyoto on the Chinese government.
They will find themselves in the position of arguing for more regulatory oversight to be imposed on businesses by one of the world’s most desperate, least trustworthy and most abusive governments.
Moreover, in the event of further natural disasters over the next decade, it is quite likely that the government in Beijing and its subordinate parochial departments may struggle to cope, and the resulting human and environmental costs will be staggering.
Perhaps, however, an alternative frame of mind may afford an opportunity for environmentalists along with human rights advocates and entrepreneurs.
The commercial development of clean, efficient and independent energy and water technologies is a relatively high-tech affair, but one which entrepreneurs in Taiwan, with their wealth of high-end research, development and engineering expertise, could be well placed to successfully exploit and eventually introduce to Chinese consumers and businesses located in China.
Worthy of particular attention are nanoscale water filters which eradicate all known viruses and bacteria by filtering water at the molecular level, and radioisotope batteries, which generate electricity from the temperature differential across a magnetic field caused by radiation from small and easily shielded quantities of plutonium 238.
Both of these technologies offer the possibility of sustainable, portable, cheap and network-independent supply and re-supply of both clean water and electricity.
There are, however, several institutional barriers to entry into this potential market.
The domestic market demand for both water and energy in Taiwan is distorted by a combination of monopoly supply, farming and manufacturing subsidies and, most notably, the inclusion of private externalities on the list of public liabilities.
Were a courageous set of politicians to attempt to reform this list so that manufacturers, farmers and domestic consumers had to deal with real prices, then the demand for clean, efficient and independent water and energy technologies would improve significantly.
Even without such political retreat, it is likely that market demand for these technologies will improve over time as more money is wasted on environmentally destructive dams and centrally networked renewable energy sources that deliver energy on only the slightest of margins.
The commercial development of such technologies in Taiwan and their appropriately scaled introduction in China would not only be a boon for Taiwanese business, Taiwanese consumers and the environment in Taiwan, but also for Chinese businesses, Chinese consumers and China’s environment.
Not only that, but flourishing Taiwanese enterprises in this field would enable people in both Taiwan and China to recover more easily from natural disasters when demand for energy and clean water hit instant peaks.
These technologies would also undermine a not-insignificant arm of serial human-rights abuser, the People’s Republic of China
MICHAEL FAGAN
Tainan
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