When Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Secretary-General King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) met with the press after returning from a visit to Singapore, he said that if the KMT loses three of the five special municipality elections on Nov. 27, he would consider himself to have failed and take full responsibility. The KMT thinks it will be difficult to win in Tainan and Kaohsiung, but that it holds the upper hand in Taichung. Since it also expects a narrow win in Sinbei City, Taipei City is crucial.
The party is now concentrating its campaign efforts there, thus proving that Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Taipei mayoral candidate, Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), was right when he predicted that if he ran for mayor in Taipei, he would lock down most of the KMT’s election resources there, which would benefit the DPP’s candidates in other cities.
Following the scandal surrounding the Taipei International Flora Expo, an opinion poll conducted by a media outlet showed incumbent Taipei Mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌) trailing Su by 2 percentage points. King, however, says internal KMT opinion polls show no difference in support between the two.
Representatives of both parties say that if the DPP trails the KMT by only a small margin in pre-election polls, it could well end up winning the election. Some pan-blue supporters and most pan-green supporters think Su will be the next mayor of Taipei.
This reasoning is borne out by earlier election results, the latest county commissioner and mayoral elections in Yilan county and city being one example. There are two reasons why this is so.
First, most farmers and factory workers support the pan-green camp, while military personnel, civil servants, teachers, the middle class and business circles support the pan-blue camp.
Among pan-green supporters, there are several users per telephone, and some may not even have a chance to pick up when pollsters call. Among pan-blue supporters, however, there are fewer users per telephone, and sometimes, one person has access to several telephones, which means that when pollsters call, the pan-blue camp’s numbers are slightly inflated.
Second, many people have moved from the areas surrounding big cities into the actual cities. The proximity means that they return home frequently, so they keep their household registered in their hometown. An odd phenomenon is that many migrants tend to support the pan-green camp.
When conducting opinion polls in areas surrounding Yilan or other big cities, those who have moved out are not be able to answer the telephone, but on election day, they return home to vote. That is why the final DPP vote is higher than the KMT vote when compared to pre-election opinion polls.
These two factors do not apply in the same way in Taipei City. Although there still are more pan-green users than pan-blue users per telephone, this situation is not as pronounced as in the areas surrounding big cities. In addition, the migrant situation is the opposite of the situation in the surrounding areas.
When conducting an opinion poll, those who have moved into the big city from the surrounding areas might be included in a poll, but they cannot vote because they have their household registration in their old hometown. Clearly, although the difference between the DPP and the KMT might still be smaller in the final vote than in the pre-election polls, the effect will be smaller than in the surrounding areas.
Taipei City has always been a KMT stronghold leaving the DPP far behind. The reason Hau cannot build momentum for the Nov. 27 election is that both the KMT-led national government and Hau’s city administration have disappointed voters.
While many KMT supporters have given a negative assessment of Hau in opinion polls, some will still vote for him on election day. In other words, the view that the DPP will have a chance to win any election where they trail by only a small margin of votes in pre-election polls does not necessarily hold true in Taipei City.
The KMT’s greatest worry is not Hau’s current standing in the opinion polls, but rather whether or not his support will continue to dwindle. The party may have come up with a plan to defeat Su, but while negative campaigning is effective when aimed at an incumbent, it does not have a great effect on challengers from the opposition.
In other words, the KMT’s attempt to go on the attack to defend its position in Taipei will not necessarily be successful. Hau should try to concentrate on his own weak spots instead of directing all his efforts at finding his opponent’s shortcomings.
Taipei residents expect more of the city government than residents in other cities. Hau is unable to present positive political achievements, dares not distance himself from the mistakes committed by his predecessor and cannot disassociate himself from the irregularities that have occurred during his own term in office.
As the DPP reveals irregularities related to the flora expo, the KMT accuses it of attacking the expo itself — in other words, not only do they not appear to understand the need to disassociate the expo from the irregularities, their strategy actively links the two together. The KMT has chosen the wrong path.
Chen Mao-hsiung is a retired National Sun Yat-sen University professor.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
RSS