The planned economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) may be scheduled to be signed this month, but a clear domestic consensus on the issue remains elusive.
In various public opinion polls, approval of an ECFA remains below 50 percent, while opposition to it hovers at about 35 percent. The number of respondents in favor of putting the agreement to a referendum remains between 60 percent and 80 percent. It is thus clear that the planned ECFA is a highly controversial policy.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs, however, opposes a referendum, saying that, “of 276 FTAs [free-trade agreements] that have taken effect, not one has been put to a referendum.” This is a serious distortion of the facts and it will only serve to further intensify social division.
FTAs registered at the WTO are formally called regional trade agreements (RTA) and they include agreements liberalizing trade in products and services. Nominally speaking, RTAs include FTAs, customs unions, economic communities, economic alliances, preferential trade agreements and so on. In addition, RTAs cover an increasingly wider scope by far exceeding the scope of traditional FTAs.
The purpose and effect of RTAs not only involve economic efficiency or growth, they also affect the distribution of economic benefits and strategic concerns. The Doha Round of WTO talks ran aground because of the protective industrial interests of different countries.
The effects of such an agreement could be of a very political nature. Last year, Taiwan’s national security bureaucrats said an ECFA was the first of three main elements in cross-strait political talks. That raises the question of whether or not political talks will be the next step in cross-strait relations.
Looking at the history of European integration, 19 of the 27 member states have made referendums part of the domestic approval process for participation in European economic integration FTAs.
Here are a few examples: Norway has held two referendums — in 1972 and in 1994 — rejecting first the European Economic Community (EEC) and then the EU. The UK held a referendum in 1975 that resulted in the UK joining the EEC. Ireland has held four referendums on whether or not to participate in European economic integration, in 1972, 1987, 1992 and 2008 and the list goes on.
Outside of Europe, Costa Rica held a referendum in October 2007, to decide whether or not to join the Central America FTA proposed by the US.
In mid-April, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Secretary-General King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) said they were not opposed to holding a referendum on an ECFA, but they have now instructed the Mainland Affairs Council and the ministry to oppose such a referendum at the Referendum Review Committee.
The government’s contradictory behavior is likely to further aggravate tensions between the government and those who oppose the pact. As we’re facing a situation where the planned ECFA is about to be signed and the risk that this may set off violent clashes and social instability, the committee should not only look to the text of the proposed referendum, it should also stress that a referendum is the only way to resolve the dispute between the government and the opposition and build a consensus. Furthermore, this it is the solution that represents the lowest cost to society.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor in the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University. Wu Chih-chung is secretary-general of the European Union Study Association.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when