The first stage of the signature collection process for an economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) referendum proposed by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) — “Do you agree that the government should sign an ECFA with China?” — has been completed and will be submitted to the Referendum Review Committee. Preparations for the second stage — where 860,000 signatures must be collected — are continuing and people nationwide are expected to react with an overwhelming response.
At this crucial moment, the pan-blue camp is getting hung up on trivialities, saying that although the TSU is clearly opposed to the ECFA, its referendum proposal asks if voters agree to an ECFA. If the number of ballots do not pass the required threshold, the pan-blues say, the TSU could still claim that the public opposes an ECFA. Opponents of the referendum say such political calculations are using cracks in the Referendum Act (公民投票法), suggesting that if the referendum proposal passes, it could cause a crisis in the democratic system and harm the institution of referendums.
In taking such political measures, the pan-blue camp is clearly trying to influence the Referendum Review Committee so that its review will be disadvantageous to the TSU proposal. They may even be trying to direct the committee to kill the proposal. The word “agree” in the proposal, however, essentially means “ do you or do you not agree?”
The referendums on Taiwan joining the UN launched by the Democratic Progressive Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in 2008 both used the word “agree,” which also meant “do you or do you not agree?”
It is common knowledge that the TSU opposes the ECFA, as do many Taiwanese. All ECFA opponents are asking is that they be allowed the legal right to hold a referendum to let the public express their will and counterbalance the government’s obstinate behavior since the KMT-dominated legislature is incapable of effectively monitoring the government.
It is very simple: If you hold a referendum on the ECFA, then those who oppose it can show their opposition through their ballots and those who support it can likewise express it by ballot. After all, haven’t both President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) said in public that they are not opposed to a referendum? Let’s ask the public what they think.
Those who oppose an ECFA can ask voters to vote against it, while those in support can ask voters to support it. That would facilitate a debate between representatives of the two camps, gradually clarifying the truth about the proposed ECFA. There’s no point to worrying that a failure to pass the threshold of votes for a referendum could be interpreted to mean that the public does not want an ECFA.
Those with ulterior political motives who accuse the TSU of such scheming would do better to direct their efforts toward mobilizing ECFA supporters so they can win a landslide victory in support of the agreement. That would be the best solution, since it considers both those who want an ECFA referendum and those who support an ECFA.
Regrettably, that’s not what the critics want. They oppose any referendum and would be more likely to directly or indirectly ask ECFA supporters not to vote at all. That is why they worry that by ensuring that the referendum does not pass the threshold number of voters required, they will help make the TSU’s political calculations succeed.
What is it that makes this referendum so dangerous? It’s not a natural disaster or a monster; it’s a way to let the public say “yea” or “nay” to an ECFA. If the pan-blue camp did all it could instead to encourage ECFA supporters to call for a referendum and the subsequent result is majority support for an ECFA, it would be an opportunity for them to prove that the government’s policy is founded on strong public support.
Looking at the referendum ballot, there is a field for the main referendum question and a field each for “agree” and “disagree.” There is no risk that voters will be confused and the wording of the referendum text will not affect the public’s referendum rights. If the TSU’s proposal causes concerns that it will be interpreted as public opposition to an ECFA if voter turnout does not reach the threshold number, that is not the result of any kind of political scheming. Rather, it is a product of loopholes in the Referendum Law, which would mean that it should be amended.
The same thing happened with the two referendums on UN membership for Taiwan: Neither reached the minimum voter turnout due to the high turnout threshold and the KMT’s active discouragement of the public from voting. The KMT interpreted this as the public’s opposition to both referendums. Those who are critical of the TSU’s referendum proposal used this very approach to interpret these two referendums, so they are now reaping what they sowed.
The TSU’s referendum question is intended to let the public express clear agreement or disagreement with the proposed ECFA. This is in line with the idea that sovereignty rests with the people. By getting caught up in trivialities, the pan-blue camp has highlighted a longstanding democratic problem, namely, that some people are opposed to the use of the referendum. As a result, they always think there is political scheming behind referendum demands, which is why they always try to block referendums from passing the minimum voter threshold requirement.
If these people do not change their anti-democratic behavior and continue to discuss the trivialities of irrelevant issues, thus hampering the referendum process, they will put Taiwan’s democracy at risk and harm the referendum system.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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