In the run up to yesterday’s debate on the proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) between the leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and Democratic Progressive Party, (DPP) Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), both parties looked to score political points. The DPP accused the Ma administration of not unveiling the details of ECFA negotiations to the DPP, putting Tsai at a disadvantage for the debate. The DPP also discarded the open documents provided by the Ministry of Economics as being worthless. For its part, the KMT argued, since negotiations are still ongoing, sensitive items and the bottom line should not be released for the sake of debate.
The Ma government, instead, urged the DPP to come up with an effective alternative proposal to the ECFA. In addition to political wrangling and rhetoric, the KMT further floated a trial balloon by arguing that it never opposed a referendum on the ECFA in accordance with the law and denied that the government had changed its stance on holding referendums. Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and KMT Secretary-General King Pu-tsung (金溥聰) stated that the Ma government would accept an ECFA referendum after the legislature completes its ECFA review.
The KMT about-face on an ECFA referendum illustrated nothing but political calculation because Ma has said on numerous occasions before that a referendum on an ECFA was unnecessary for a simple reason — it would not touch upon political issues. In any advanced democracy, holding a referendum on major public policy is a demonstration of direct and democratic participation by the public on key decision-making processes.
Unfortunately, referendums have often been considered as a political weapon that could be used to promote self-determination and de jure Taiwan independence. While they have become more conceptually acceptable to the public as a democratic instrument in recent years following the passage of the Referendum Act in 2003 and four subsequent referendums, it is unfortunate that the KMT has used referendums more as political tools. Moreover, the KMT has long been a destructive element when it comes to the implementation of such a democratic mechanism in Taiwan politics.
To counteract former president Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) maneuvering for a referendum in his reelection bid in 2003, the KMT passed the Referendum Act in the Legislative Yuan setting a very high threshold for initiatiating a referendum. However, Chen found a loophole in Article 17 of the law by launching the first-ever “defensive referendum” along with the presidential election in 2004. The KMT obstructed the referendum and violated the democratic principle of people’s freedom of choice by calling for its supporters not to cast referendum ballots.
In 2007 and 2008, the Chen administration introduced two more referendums, including one on using the name Taiwan to apply for full membership in the UN. Despite tremendous pressure from the US, then-KMT presidential candidate Ma came up with his own version of holding a referendum for the Republic of China to “return” to the UN. Nevertheless, the real intention was not to promote the idea of referendums, but rather to derail the DPP’s referendum momentum.
Only in one rare exception did the KMT endorse a referendum — on allowing casinos on the offshore island of Penghu — a proposition residents rejected. In the face of the ongoing signature-collecting drive against the ECFA, launched primarily by the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), the DPP and other social groups, the Ma administration tried to downplay the potential effect of the ECFA referendum by sending a signal that it won’t oppose the referendum move, only to block the opposition’s attempt to hold a referendum by using administrative means and its legislative majority.
Therefore, the KMT-dominated congress vetoed two proposals submitted by the DPP on establishing an independent committee to review the ECFA, as well as an ECFA referendum before signing. The KMT’s strategy is clear: Buy more time to sign the ECFA and take advantage of its legislative majority to accept the economic pact. Unless the opposition-led ECFA referendum drive can reach the threshold of initiating a referendum to veto the legislative review, Ma will fulfill his goal.
To minimize the potential challenge from Tsai in the debate, Ma and the KMT have adopted an ambiguous position on accepting an ECFA referendum. It might serve their own interests, but further sabotage Taiwan’s democratic progress.
Liu Shih-chung is a senior research fellow at the Taipei-based Taiwan Brain Trust.
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