Ma’s inaccurate language
In his recent teleconference with Harvard University, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) made the statement: “The time for unification at this stage is not ripe yet.”
In making this statement, Ma misrepresents social and political realities in Taiwan. It is certainly true that the time for unification between Taiwan and China is not ripe.
In using this particular language, however, Ma implies that Taiwanese are moving toward a time ripe for unification. In fact, public opinion polls in Taiwan indicate quite clearly that Taiwanese are moving in the opposite direction. A variety of polls from different organizations consistently show an increase in Taiwanese versus Chinese identity and a greater desire for formal, internationally recognized independence for Taiwan.
Why would the democratically elected leader of Taiwan choose to inaccurately represent the opinions and attitudes of his constituents?
In making this statement, Ma is trying to appease the leaders in Beijing who, of course, insist that unification with Taiwan is one of China’s core interests, and the deep-blue members of his party who still hold on to their dream of unification.
Ma’s appeasing language is very dangerous, however, because it sends the rest of the world the message that Taiwanese are moving toward a desire for unification and therefore encourages leaders in foreign governments to base their China and Taiwan policies on an inaccurate interpretation of trends in Taiwan.
Ma is well advised to remember that he was elected to represent the interests of the 23 million people in Taiwan, and not the feelings of the leaders in Beijing. He should be more careful in choosing his words. Given the diplomatic sensitivity of the issue, one might understand why Ma does not make the statement, “the time for independence is not ripe yet,” but he could certainly make the statement, “the time for the 23 million people of Taiwan to formally decide on their future status is not ripe yet.”
This language more accurately represents the realities in Taiwan and demonstrates the kind of ambiguity that Ma claims to love so much when he discusses his “1992 consensus.”
Don Rodgers
Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Soochow University,
Taipei
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