On capital punishment, President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has said that “We will gradually narrow the scope of capital punishment to minimize violations to human rights.” One main reason he is unwilling to abolish capital punishment is that a majority of the public opposes doing so.
Ma says abolishing the death penalty is a long-term goal, but that it is not currently supported by mainstream public opinion. Minister of Justice Tseng Yung-fu (曾勇夫) says he does not have any preconceived ideas on the issue and that he will listen to public opinion before coming up with complementary measures in response.
It appears that public opinion is the main factor behind the government’s policy.
Ma says opinion poll results show that more than 70 percent of the public opposes abolishing the death penalty and that it is also opposed by 88 percent of judicial officers. However, these results simply reflect whether respondents support the abolishment of capital punishment or not.
This direct yes-or-no question can hardly reflect the complexities of public opinion on the matter.
Even in many countries that have already abolished the death penalty, a majority of the public is still opposed to scrapping it.
An opinion poll conducted in 2006 in Taiwan found that 53 percent of respondents supported the idea of replacing the death penalty with life imprisonment without parole, while 44 percent did not support the such an initiative.
Asked whether it should be possible to commute the sentence of death row inmates to life or lengthy imprisonment if they perform well and show regret, 62 percent of respondents said “yes” and once again a minority — 35 percent — said “no.”
The results show that mainstream public opinion preferred to give such inmates a second chance instead of killing them no matter what.
Generally speaking, the main reason why people support the death penalty is that it means that those who kill others are themselves killed.
However, when asked whether those who kill must therefore be given a death sentence, the numbers were quite close, with 49 percent saying “yes” and 45 percent saying “no.”
It is therefore clear that mainstream public opinion does not necessarily think a killer should always be given a death sentence, and saying otherwise could even be said to be controversial.
Although 88 percent of judicial officers oppose abolishing capital punishment according to opinion poll results, that same percentage of the public believes Taiwanese courts could make mistakes when issuing death sentences.
How can death sentences be issued when the public shows such distrust in Taiwanese courts?
Tseng has instructed the Ministry of Justice to conduct an opinion poll of views on the death penalty every six months.
If the minister wants to base a decision on whether to abolish capital punishment on public opinion as expressed in responses to a simple yes or no question, he need not bother.
In the next few years, especially during Tseng’s term as minister, it is likely that about 70 percent of the public will continue to support the death penalty.
If the ministry really wants to base related policies and complementary measures on public opinion, then an in-depth study into the complexities of public opinion is needed.
Chiu Hei-yuan is a research fellow at the Institute of Sociology at Academia Sinica.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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