Responding to a public outcry and calls from legislators from her own party to step down, Minister of Justice Wang Ching-feng (王清峰) resigned on Thursday night. In an open letter on Wednesday, Wang stated her opposition to the death penalty and said she “would rather go to hell” than order the execution of the 44 convicts on death row.
From a humanitarian standpoint, Wang’s behavior was admirable. But when the highest judicial official in the land publicly advocates breaking the law and violates the neutrality she should maintain between criminal and victim, she hurts the government, the Ministry of Justice and the spirit of the law — not to mention the campaign against the death penalty.
Wang’s personal opposition to the death penalty and her public refusal in her position as justice minister to carry out the law are two different things. She is entitled to her own ideals and values, but the question was if she, as the justice minister, had the right to ignore a verdict or possessed the power to grant pardons so she could refuse to carry out the law, especially since these cases have gone through extraordinary appeals and been finalized, with some cases even having been subjected to a constitutional interpretation. The answer is no.
No executions have been carried out since 2006. There are now 44 death row inmates who do not know whether they will live or die. In a democracy, executions always set off a hot debate between proponents and opponents of the death sentence, and a decision involving 44 lives is sure to have a major political and social impact.
The public and the media have questioned this situation, but as past justice ministers have trod carefully and found reasons to postpone the executions, both the public and media have avoided forcing the ministry’s hand.
When Wang publicly declared her refusal to order any executions, she challenged the families of victims and the general public. Opinion polls show that more than 70 percent of respondents oppose abolishing the death penalty and that 40 percent thought Wang should step down. The Control Yuan deemed it necessary to launch an investigation and legislators from both camps were asking questions. Not even President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who opposes the death penalty, could protect Wang. Both the Presidential Office and the premier declared that while public opinion remains divided over the future of capital punishment, the Ministry of Justice should go ahead and order that the executions be carried out. This was a major blow to Taiwan’s movement against the death penalty.
Wang was not the first justice minister to oppose capital punishment. When Ma held the post 20 years ago, he was personally against it but understood the legal implications of his job and that executions had to be carried out until the law is changed. Chen Ding-nan (陳定南) and later justice ministers also moved toward the abolition of the death penalty by doing such things as changing mandatory death sentences to discretionary sentences, thus giving judges greater freedom to decide.
Apart from not ordering any executions, Wang did little during her two years in office. She did not initiate a debate about the death penalty or plan any legal amendments, nor did she campaign for the abolition of capital punishment. When she suddenly took such a public stance on the issue, it was not surprising that many media outlets questioned whether she was simply out for publicity.
Wang’s statements were not widely supported by either the public or government officials. While she may be a good human rights lawyer, she was a less impressive justice minister.
Taiwan should reject two flawed answers to the Eswatini controversy: that diplomatic allies no longer matter, or that they must be preserved at any cost. The sustainable answer is to maintain formal diplomatic relations while redesigning development relationships around transparency, local ownership and democratic accountability. President William Lai’s (賴清德) canceled trip to Eswatini has elicited two predictable reactions in Taiwan. One camp has argued that the episode proves Taiwan must double down on support for every remaining diplomatic ally, because Beijing is tightening the screws, and formal recognition is too scarce to risk. The other says the opposite: If maintaining
India’s semiconductor strategy is undergoing a quiet, but significant, recalibration. With the rollout of India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0, New Delhi is signaling a shift away from ambition-driven leaps toward a more grounded, capability-led approach rooted in industrial realities and institutional learning. Rather than attempting to enter the most advanced nodes immediately, India has chosen to prioritize mature technologies in the 28-nanometer to 65-nanometer range. That would not be a retreat, but a strategic alignment with domestic capabilities, market demand and global supply chain gaps. The shift carries the imprimatur of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, indicating that the recalibration is
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), during an interview for the podcast Lanshuan Time (蘭萱時間) released on Monday, said that a US professor had said that she deserved to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize following her meeting earlier this month with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). Cheng’s “journey of peace” has garnered attention from overseas and from within Taiwan. The latest My Formosa poll, conducted last week after the Cheng-Xi meeting, shows that Cheng’s approval rating is 31.5 percent, up 7.6 percentage points compared with the month before. The same poll showed that 44.5 percent of respondents
China last week announced that it picked two Pakistani astronauts for its Tiangong space station mission, indicating the maturation of the two nations’ relationship from terrestrial infrastructure cooperation to extraterrestrial strategic domains. For Taiwan and India, the developments present an opportunity for democratic collaboration in space, particularly regarding dual-use technologies and the normative frameworks for outer space governance. Sino-Pakistani space cooperation dates back to the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, with a cooperative agreement between the Pakistani Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry. Space cooperation was integrated into the China-Pakistan