As expected, Beijing has lodged strong protests against the arms sale to Taiwan announced by the administration of US President Barack Obama last month.
The Chinese government expressed “strong indignation,” accusing the US of violating the so-called “one China” principle, the three Sino-US communiques, infringing upon China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and undermining China’s efforts at peaceful unification with Taiwan, among other things. Moreover, Beijing has suspended military exchanges with the US and has said it will impose sanctions on the US firms involved in the sale.
For 30 years, the US has observed a “one China” policy, but the definition of that policy is vastly different to Beijing’s. After former US president Jimmy Carter established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, recognizing it to be China’s legal government and severing official ties with Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government in Taipei, he and his successors have not accepted the PRC’s claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
This was why in April 1979 Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act, a law approved by Congress that contains security clauses and mandates the US to provide arms so that Taiwan can defend itself.
The PRC has since relentlessly pressured the US to terminate arms sales, but neither Carter nor his Republican or Democratic successors have ever agreed to do so. As a matter of fact, in the process of negotiating the US-China “normalization of relations” in the second half of 1978, Carter insisted on the rights of the US to continue to sell arms to help Taiwan defend itself, a demand that then-Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) rejected at the outset. The issue was a bone of contention for months.
By December 1978, Beijing seemed to take a different tact and saw an urgent need to establish the “American connection” to strengthen China’s strategic position. Chinese leaders were in earnest preparation for another major task — to move against Vietnam (then a Soviet client), or as Deng put it: “To teach Vietnam a lesson.”
Thus, the issue of US arms sales to Taiwan was no longer a stumbling block. Whereas Beijing continued to voice its objections to US arms sales to Taiwan, it agreed to formalize official ties with the US. The decision was simultaneously announced in mid-December by Beijing and Washington.
After Taiwan-friendly former US president Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981, Beijing mounted an intense campaign to pressure the US to end arms sales to Taiwan. The result of 10 months hard bargaining was a joint communique on Aug. 17, 1982, better known as the “817 Communique.”
While the US refused to set an explicit cutoff date for its arms sales to Taiwan, it declared its intention to restrict its arms supplies at 1982 levels of quality and quantity, and to reduce sales gradually, “leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”
Reagan maintained that the US pledge would be linked to China’s promise to strive for a peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s future, but Beijing has denied and rejected such a linkage.
On July 14, more than a month before the “817 Communique” was issued, Reagan transmitted “six assurances” through his representative in Taipei, James Lilley, to then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國)
These reaffirmed US policy not to set a cutoff date for arms sales to Taiwan, not to consult with the PRC on the arms sales, not to pressure Taipei to begin negotiations with Beijing, not to undertake the role of mediator between Taiwan and China, not to revise the Taiwan Relation Act and to affirm that the US position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan and its associated islands had not changed.
In the 1980s, the US resorted to “transfer of technologies,” an area not covered by the “817 Communique,” to help Taiwan produce IDF fighters and it leased retired frigates to Taiwan to strengthen its defensive capabilities.
In 1992, then-US president George H. W. Bush, called a “good friend” by Beijing, announced the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan, a big sale that surpassed both the quantity and quality mentioned in the “817 Communique.” The US justification was that the transfer was necessary to redress the military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing protested loudly, threatened to withdraw from international arms control talks and retaliated by selling medium-range missiles to Pakistan.
In the past decades,the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has rapidly modernized and the cross-strait balance of military power has severely tilted toward China. Moreover, China has refused to renounce the use of force and has adopted an “Anti-Secession” Law to legitimize the threat of force.
Currently, more than 1,500 Chinese missiles are deployed against targets in Taiwan, in clear and direct contravention of the Chinese promise in the “817 Communique” to strive for a peaceful solution.
The latest US arms sale to Taiwan, which includes 114 Patriot missiles, 60 Blackhawk helicopters, two Osprey mine-hunting ships, and command and control technology and support, is primarily defensive. If the PRC has no intention of launching a military attack against Taiwan, then what is the rationale of brewing such a political storm over the arms package?
Some analysts in the US think that Beijing is miscalculating its leverage and attribute the highly assertive Chinese attitude now being observed to the arrogance of a newly rising power.
That could be true, but they may have overlooked China’s domestic politics.
Although Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) is in charge of foreign policy, he also has critics. One of them is former Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民), who is known to have criticized Hu for being too “soft” on the US and retains the support of hardliners in the party and the PLA.
As the 18th Party Congress approaches and, in accordance with the party regulations, Hu steps down from the post of party general secretary in October 2012 and the nine-man ruling Party Politburo Standing Committee is reshuffled, a succession struggle has begun.
That Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平) will replace Hu as the next party general secretary is a foregone conclusion, but the 18th Party Congress will also elect a new Politburo and ambitious party officials who strive to climb the ladder of success are making their moves.
Conceivably, hardliners in the PLA and the party are seizing on the issues of US arms sales to Taiwan and Obama’s recent meeting with the Dalai Lama to put pressure on Hu.
Those of us who have closely studied China’s foreign policy know only too well that when Beijing gets an inch, it will want to take a mile. Obama should be praised and congratulated for standing firm and making the right, courageous decision on arms sales and the meeting with the Dalai Lama, not allowing Chinese leaders to use threats to adversely affect US policy and the national interest.
Taiwan-US-China relations have made great progress in 30 years. Wise and balanced US arms sales to Taiwan have contributed to the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region, and have made the incipient Taiwan-China detente possible.
On the other hand, however, China continues to build up its offensive military capabilities along the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s military capabilities have fallen further behind those of the PRC, hence it is imperative that Obama should resist China’s pressure and, as soon as possible, make available to Taiwan the advanced F-16C/D fighters that it needs to deter military coercion and defend itself.
There is no reason for Washington to believe that Taiwan’s unification with China is desirable or inevitable. The three Sino-US Communiques do not commit the US to Taiwan’s unification with China — and democratic changes in Taiwan have precluded it.
The US relationship with a democratic Taiwan is valuable in its own right and should not be subordinated to or become merely a function of US-China relations.
Parris Chang is a professor emeritus of political science at Pennsylvania State University and former deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council.
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