US President Barack Obama’s first trip to China was like a splendid stage play. The performance was long rehearsed in both Washington and Beijing, because both governments needed at least the appearance of a successful visit. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needed Obama’s unequivocal endorsement of China’s increasingly important international role in order to buttress its domestic legitimacy. The US needed China’s cooperation to demonstrate the effectiveness of Obama’s new strategy of collaborative global leadership.
Now that the play is over and the applause has died down, it is time to check the balance sheet and see how much Obama achieved and how much he conceded.
On the positive side of the ledger, Obama received ceremonial treatment not normally accorded to visiting foreign leaders, even other visiting US presidents, demonstrating the importance China’s government attached to the visit. Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) sent his likely successor, Vice President Xi Jinping (習近平), to greet Obama at Beijing Airport, going well beyond the usual protocol. And Hu himself dined with Obama twice during his two-day stay in Beijing — a gesture never made to any visiting foreign leader, including former US president George W. Bush.
Obama also initially appeared to make some progress in giving voice to the universal values of human rights and democracy. He met with students in Shanghai in his favorite “town hall” format, which allowed for face-to-face discussions with young Chinese. Moreover, China’s government allowed the Nanfang Zhoumo, the country’s most liberal newspaper, to conduct a 12-minute exclusive interview with Obama.
But the Chinese public soon discounted the value of these political set pieces. People quickly discovered that the “students” allowed to ask questions at Obama’s town-hall meeting in Shanghai were young CCP activists. Moreover, unlike with other US presidents, the event was not broadcast nationwide, and Nanfang Zhoumo’s full interview with Obama did not appear in the newspaper, despite the CCP propaganda departments’ advance approval of all the interview questions.
And the negative side of the ledger? Obama gave up two things that have usually been at the top of the agenda when US presidents meet with Chinese leaders.
First, Obama did not openly criticize the Chinese government’s notorious human rights record, nor did he use his influence to persuade China to release any prisoner of conscience, as his US predecessors always did when visiting the country.
While Obama toasted Hu, Liu Xiaobo (劉曉波), a famous Chinese dissident, remained shut away in an unknown location, having vanished last December because of his leading role in drafting a written appeal for constitutional rights.
Soon after Obama left China, two other writers, Huang Qi (黃琦) and Tan Zuoren (譚作人), were sentenced to prison.
Their crime was to investigate cases of corruption by local government officials that were linked to the deaths of tens of thousands of students in the Sichuan Earthquake in May last year.
Second, Obama did not seriously seek to resolve existing US-China economic disagreements, particularly over trade. With China running a seemingly perpetual external surplus, foreign-currency reserves have continued to mount even during the global economic crisis, with net growth reaching US$140 billion in the third quarter of this year.
China’s main trade partners are deeply worried about the consequences of this continuing imbalance.
They urge China’s government to reduce its export subsidies and to allow the yuan to appreciate, expecting such measures to reduce their trade deficits, help their economies recover, and create more jobs. On this front, however, China’s leaders made no compromise with Obama.
So, on balance, Obama’s first trip to China achieved relatively little. Moreover, what he did achieve looks superficial, while what he gave up seems substantial.
Of course, this is partly because of the changes in the relative economic and political power of the US and China over the past decade, and especially during the current global economic crisis. However, the sizable deficit on the balance sheet of Obama’s China trip could have been much lower if Obama had paid more attention to substance. It seems that Hu is more skillful than the polished Obama at maximizing his gains at little cost.
Zhang Wei is a lecturer in Chinese economy at Cambridge University.
COPYRIGHT: PROJECT SYNDICATE
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with