A seminar IN Taipei to mark the 60th anniversary of cross-strait relations on Nov. 13 and Nov. 14 was intended to reflect the changes in the relationship between Taiwan and China over the years, but regrettably, the Chinese mindset remains the same as it was six decades ago: China will annex Taiwan. Not even the pan-blue camp, which supports mutual cooperation between the two nations, can accept this notion.
The Chinese delegation was led by Zheng Bijian (鄭必堅), who was introduced in the media as a member of Chinese President Hu Jintao’s (胡錦濤) brain trust and a former vice president of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Party School. Zheng is widely credited for being the first to talk publicly about China’s “peaceful” rise during the Boao Forum in 2003 to allay growing global concerns about Beijing’s expanding power. However, this notion of peaceful development is nothing but an illusion, with Beijing throwing a big military parade to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China last month. Two conclusions that can be drawn from Zheng’s rigid mindset and the incoherent comments of other Chinese delegates at the seminar were that they are blind to reality and that Hu Jintao wishes to rush unification with Taiwan.
Zheng’s remark that the majority of the public opposed Taiwanese independence and that the independence movement was doomed was sheer nonsense. It is clear that he misconstrued Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) election as president as public opposition to Taiwanese independence. Ma did not have the nerve to hold a referendum on signing an economic cooperation framework agreement with China because of strong public opposition to the economic pact. Several opinion polls conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council also suggest that about 70 percent of the public consider themselves Taiwanese. Although “Taiwanese” does not necessarily mean “people in support of Taiwanese independence,” it is certainly different from “Chinese.”
Why did these Chinese delegates participate in the seminar? That’s because Hu is in a rush. Ma is not aggressive enough and the Chinese delegates were afraid that the Democratic Progressive Party might return to power. Hu is also at a disadvantage in an internal party struggle, and it was obvious that he was under considerable stress during the APEC summit. Hu must therefore resort to united-front tactics to carry out Beijing’s unification agenda.
Ma is in the same situation. His approval ratings have dropped and he has lost much weight as he comes under increasing attack within his party. Thus, he is in a desperate need of Hu’s support. The hasty signing of a memorandum of understanding on cross-strait financial supervisory cooperation reflects the similarities in their situation.
The problem is not the decline of support for Taiwanese independence, but the fact that Beijing’s authoritarian government is on the wane and local factions are on the rise as evidenced by Beijing’s failure to control the political situation in Xinjiang and Chongqing.
Paul Lin is a political commentator.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
On Sept. 3 in Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) rolled out a parade of new weapons in PLA service that threaten Taiwan — some of that Taiwan is addressing with added and new military investments and some of which it cannot, having to rely on the initiative of allies like the United States. The CCP’s goal of replacing US leadership on the global stage was advanced by the military parade, but also by China hosting in Tianjin an August 31-Sept. 1 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which since 2001 has specialized
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
A large part of the discourse about Taiwan as a sovereign, independent nation has centered on conventions of international law and international agreements between outside powers — such as between the US, UK, Russia, the Republic of China (ROC) and Japan at the end of World War II, and between the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of China at the UN. Internationally, the narrative on the PRC and Taiwan has changed considerably since the days of the first term of former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the Democratic
RSS