At an academic seminar on Oct. 25, former presidential adviser Peng Ming-min (彭明敏) predicted that China is likely to make every effort to help secure President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) re-election in 2012.
Peng said Beijing is likely to withdraw missiles it is aiming at Taiwan, propose a peace agreement and stimulate Taiwan’s stock market to boost Ma’s momentum and lure Taiwanese into voting for him again.
Peng is not a prophet, but his prediction that China will make every effort to help Ma is perfectly sensible. Speculation that Ma intends to turn Taiwan into a special administrative region of China, or that he is trying to win the Nobel Peace Prize by signing a cross-strait peace agreement with Beijing, is far-fetched, but it is an undeniable fact that the president’s weak character and fear of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) set him apart from his predecessors.
Beijing is, of course, quite happy with the situation, and it probably doesn’t want another Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) candidate to replace Ma, let alone a transfer of power to the Democratic Progressive Party. After all, who matches Ma in the pushover stakes?
In trying to help Ma, Beijing will likely use the methods that Peng mentioned, but it is even more likely to use other channels to spread rumors of what will happen to Taiwan if Ma does not gain a second term.
Its threat against Kaohsiung City for displaying a documentary about World Uyghur Congress president Rebiya Kadeer was a rehearsal for future blackmail against Taiwan.
Peng raised another key issue: What will become of Taiwanese identity when the inducements begin to appear? Will we resist them, or will we be mesmerized and follow Ma down the road of no return?
The answer to this question may not be so cheerful. As the saying goes, “the first falling leaf heralds the autumn.” A few examples will be enough to illustrate the numbness of Taiwanese and whether or not identity will have a role to play.
The Kaohsiung City Government’s decision to screen the documentary about Kadeer while disregarding Chinese threats attempted to maintain national dignity. Surprisingly, however, Kaohsiung City Council Speaker Chuang Chi-wang (莊啟旺) of the KMT requested that the city government take the overall situation into account and acquiesce to China, while some councilors suggested that the city government’s budget be blocked.
Would anyone with true Taiwanese identity do such a thing? If Goto Shimpei — a chief administrator of Taiwan during the Japanese era who mocked Taiwanese for fearing death and loving money — were still alive today, he would laugh with disdain.
Now in his eighties, Peng has a deep concern for Taiwan, unlike many of Taiwan’s youth, who are addicted to the Internet or night clubs and who idolize stars and models. The latter are not concerned about the predicament facing their free society.
All this tells us that Taiwanese are likely to hand their fate to Ma once more as a result of China’s carrot-and-stick approach.
Will the public then realize how precious freedom is after it has been lost?
David S. Min is a political commentator and author of Heartfelt Wishes of a Citizen.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question. In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and
The conflict in the Middle East has been disrupting financial markets, raising concerns about rising inflationary pressures and global economic growth. One market that some investors are particularly worried about has not been heavily covered in the news: the private credit market. Even before the joint US-Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, global capital markets had faced growing structural pressure — the deteriorating funding conditions in the private credit market. The private credit market is where companies borrow funds directly from nonbank financial institutions such as asset management companies, insurance companies and private lending platforms. Its popularity has risen since
Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
For Taiwan, the ongoing US and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets are a warning signal: When a major power stretches the boundaries of self-defense, smaller states feel the tremors first. Taiwan’s security rests on two pillars: US deterrence and the credibility of international law. The first deters coercion from China. The second legitimizes Taiwan’s place in the international community. One is material. The other is moral. Both are indispensable. Under the UN Charter, force is lawful only in response to an armed attack or with UN Security Council authorization. Even pre-emptive self-defense — long debated — requires a demonstrably imminent