China and democratization
The recent plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee adopted “party construction” as its main agenda item, meaning that several intra-party democratization reforms will be promoted.
Five years ago, the central committee plenum also adopted “party construction” as its principal agenda item and it released a resolution on strengthening the CCP’s governance.
Intra-party democratization has again emerged as a priority policy because the CCP has no intention of abandoning its monopoly on political power. Since the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989 there has been no significant political reform. But the Chinese leadership is keenly interested in enhancing the CCP’s governance capabilities and performance and responsiveness to public opinion on the part of cadres at all levels. Internal democratization is perceived as useful.
In recent months, Chinese media have highlighted several reform experiments. These include: the direct election of CCP committee leaders by all party members in Lingshan Township, Pingchang County, Sichuan Province; the reform of CCP representatives’ congress into an active standing organ in Taizhou, Zhejiang Province; and the reform of the CCP committee system in Minxing District, Shanghai, including the standing committee holding a question session for all members of the party committee and the election of the preliminary list of candidates for officials at the county head level, with choices by the entire party committee.
These reforms are not new; they have been mulled for at least three or four years. Apparently they encountered some resistance and now Chinese leaders would like to promote them again.
Adopting “party construction” as the main theme of the coming Central Committee plenum is a bit surprising; in view of the global financial crisis, economic issues might have been expected to be more pressing.
But in the eyes of the Chinese leadership, it is exactly because of the economic difficulties that social stability has become of greater concern.
Rapid economic growth in the past decades has given rise to contradictions; in the context of an economic downturn, rising unemployment and other problems, these contradictions have been exacerbated.
Chinese leaders are under pressure to reduce hardships and grievances.
Intra-party democratization appeals to the Chinese leadership to ensure that cadres at all levels pay attention to hardships and grievances and respond to public opinion.
A tighter crackdown on corruption in the past year was also probably intended to reduce public grievances. After all, economic difficulties, unemployment and corruption are a recipe for social unrest in China.
The rise in the number of “mass incidents” and their expansion in scale, including the riots in Tibet and Xinjiang, are warning signals. The recent Han riots in Urumqi showed that CCP organizations at the grassroots level don’t function well. This is why the city’s party secretary was sacked promptly and publicly.
Internal democratization in political terms is similar to joining the WTO in economic terms. Former premier Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基) understood that economic reform had reached a difficult stage: To overcome the resistance of vested interests, he had to rely on commitments made to the WTO.
By the same token, relying on mild campaigns and instructions from Beijing to reform the CCP would not be effective.
The party democratization measures demand strong consensus and political will on the part of the central leadership to make an impact before the 18th party congress in 2012. Reforming the election system and turning the CCP representatives’ congresses into standing organs would be relatively easy, as competition in the elections and the effectiveness of the representatives’ congresses in monitoring party secretaries at corresponding levels will depend on the circumstances.
Ensuring transparency and encouraging democratic deliberation within the CCP will be much more challenging. The declaration of financial assets by cadres has been on the agenda for more than a decade, but there is still no sign of implementation.
A resolution of the central committee plenum is far from adequate to produce results.
JOSEPH YU-SHEK CHENG
Hong Kong
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