The resounding defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the Yunlin County legislative by-election has prompted a discussion about whether candidates should be nominated based on their image or whether they should continue to be drawn from local party factions. In reality, image and factions will both play a role in future elections, but will not be key criteria. The recent discussion is outdated.
The key element of success or failure for the KMT is now the performance of the central government and the impact of this on the party’s image.
Consider a string of recent by-elections: KMT candidates Kuang Li-chen (鄺麗貞), who was elected as Taitung County Commissioner in April 2006, Chiang Nai-shin (蔣乃辛), who won the legislative seat for Taipei City’s Da-an District (大安) in March this year, Chen Luan-ying (陳鑾英), who narrowly lost to independent candidate Kang Shih-ju (康世儒) in the Miaoli legislative by-election in March and Chang Ken-hui (張艮輝), defeated by Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Liu Chien-kuo (劉建國) in Yunlin.
The results can be viewed from various angles: faction versus image, factional power base plus image branding, or factional unity versus factional rivalry.
Yet none of these is adequate to explain the KMT’s wins and losses.
Similarly, from 2005 onward, the DPP, then the ruling party, suffered a series of crushing defeats, starting with elections for county commissioners and city mayors, then for the legislature and finally for the presidency.
For most of the DPP candidates, their failure had nothing to do with their image, nor was their local power base necessarily weaker than that of their rivals. The reason for their defeat was the public’s revulsion at then-president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁).
This factor is not confined to Taiwan: The same thing has happened in Japan. In August’s election to the House of Representatives, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) went from holding 296 seats to 119 as a disappointed electorate turned against it.
Dozens of candidates from well-known political families and with fine reputations and outstanding abilities were swept from office. In contrast, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a motley alliance, miraculously leapt from 113 seats to 308 despite its weak power base at the local level and lack of political stars. In many districts, it didn’t even have a candidate and it did not put forward enough candidates for non-constituency seats.
In its early years in Taiwan, the KMT relied on martial law structures to keep it in power. After the transition to democracy, the KMT relied on its anti-independence ideology, the legend of an economic miracle and the support of local factions.
None of these three elements is effective anymore. If the KMT fails to reappraise its methods based on the examples in Japan and in recent by-elections in Taiwan and cannot find new strategies — instead sticking to its pro-China stance and limiting itself to questions of image and factions — then its prospects will not be good.
It is worth noting that the influence of Japanese voters’ party preference has on the legislative elections have been magnified by the single-member constituency system. Although the ratio of votes won by the two main parties in the Japanese poll was five to three, the ratio of constituency seats was seven to two (221 seats to 64 seats).
In Taiwan, halving the number of seats in the legislature cost the DPP 11 seats among outlying island and Aboriginal constituencies even without an election.
When Chen Shui-bian and former DPP chairman Lin Yi-hsiung (林義雄) called for a constitutional reform to cut the number of legislators in half, DPP Legislator Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) and one or two others insisted on combining the cut with a single-member constituency system and other changes.
Under the new system, the magnifying effect that Japan saw will happen in Taiwan, too.
Unless the public’s opinion of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) government improves over the next two years, the DPP may gain enough legislative seats in ordinary constituencies on Taiwan proper to make up for the loss of 11 seats on the islands and in Aboriginal areas.
In this scenario, the domino effect of losses for the KMT could extend beyond December’s elections for mayors, county commissioners and councilors. The party’s prospects for the presidential and legislative elections may not be good.
What does this mean for the DPP?
A party with ambitions cannot pin its hopes on the public’s dissatisfaction with rival parties. It must propose policies to win public support.
Following its victory in Yunlin, the DPP can for once breathe a sigh of relief.
The DPP’s central leadership says this turn for the better reflects good policies on the part of Chairperson Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) — but some senior party members beg to differ.
These senior party members should not be so eager to criticize Tsai just as the DPP is emerging from difficulties.
Nevertheless, the policies pursued by the central leadership do leave room for discussion. The leadership says Tsai is promoting party unity. Unity is a good thing, but generally speaking, a party’s “line” comprises its strategy to win public support.
Unity within a party is important, but it is not usually presented as the party line. Sometimes a party must even sacrifice a little internal unity to win outside support.
One example of this is the British Labour Party and its “third way” centrism. Also, former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s LDP won the 2005 general election based on proposals such as Post Office privatization that hurt party unity.
The DPJ’s calls last year for unity among the younger generation and resistance against old bureaucratic forces were certain to spark an internal debate, just as some of US President Barack Obama’s proposals are.
It is hard to think of examples where policy positions that led to election victories did not stir up controversy within the winning parties. Ma’s opposition to isolationism and his “6-3-3” pledge (6 percent annual economic growth, annual per capita income of US$30,000 and less than 3 percent unemployment), may be the only example.
The Yunlin by-election is just the start. With the changes in the electoral system and in constituents’ voting behavior, Taiwan’s democracy has entered a new period of political transformation. But judging from the discourse on recent election results, neither the KMT nor the DPP knows how to deal with the change.
Lin Cho-shui is a former Democratic Progressive Party legislator.
TRANSLATED BY JULIAN CLEGG
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