While President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) is about to take over as Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman, nobody is clear about how he will separate party affairs from government affairs. Now that both Premier Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) and Vice Premier Eric Chu (朱立倫) double as KMT vice chairmen, it is little wonder some critics have called the new Cabinet a “political Cabinet,” which is public opinion-driven and service-oriented.
When Ma assumed office, he said the government was ready and called for “complete governance” as well as “complete responsibility.” These words are still ringing in our ears. However, for the past year and a half, the government’s performance has been worse than terrible. Not only has domestic unemployment hit a record high, but the government’s apathy about public suffering is clear for all to see.
Unemployment is a result of the global economic slump, but many other countries have toiled to recover their economies and already produced tangible outcomes.
Did Ma take full responsibility for the delays in the rescue operations following Typhoon Morakot? The national security mechanism failed to work properly, Ma did not bring his power as commander-in-chief into full play, and the government deferred foreign aid.
All these fall within the duties of the president, but in order to sacrifice the knight to save the king, Ma demanded that the Cabinet resign to assume responsibility. Can public anger be allayed only by the resignation of the Cabinet?
Although he visited disaster areas and apologized to survivors, Ma said that “there were only complaints, no criticism.”
This is a far cry from the reality. After all, post-disaster reconstruction is about more than relocation. The serious task for the government is how to improve living standards for the disaster victims.
Ma’s overbearing behavior can be seen in his comments quoted by media over the past few years. In response to a group of Aborigines in Sindian (新店), Taipei County, during the presidential election campaign in 2007, Ma said: “I see you as human beings.”
During his visit to the disaster areas in the wake of Morakot last month, he was quoted as saying, “But I am here now, aren’t I? You see me now, don’t you?”
When a typhoon survivor cried, “President Ma, save me,” Ma responded: “Let me finish talking, and then I will save you.”
Although Ma clarified these comments afterwards, they left a deep impression on the public.
Recently, famed neurologist Chen Shun-sheng (陳順勝), citing a paper in the British medical journal Brain, said Ma might suffer from “Hubris Syndrome” — a form of acquired personality disorder of which Ma has shown signs in his peremptory comments.
Someone with hubristic traits may cause crises that otherwise could have been averted. Hubris Syndrome is a result of being under excessive pressure, lacking sleep and constantly running on adrenaline.
Although there is no drug treatment, former British foreign secretary Lord David Owen says in the paper: “Democracy is the best treatment.”
If we apply the symptoms of this illness to Ma, he at least has a narcissistic propensity with a disproportionate concern with his image and presentation. He believes that he is accountable solely to history and tends to lose contact with reality. Not only that, he has shown signs of restlessness, recklessness and impulsiveness.
In terms of the foresight and gravitas that a president should have and the ability to assign the right people to the right positions, Ma is even more problematic.
Ma is always the man who calls the shots behind the scenes. The premier and other Cabinet members are his pawns. This can be shown by the fact that the Presidential Office announced the lineup of Liu Chao-shiuan’s (劉兆玄) Cabinet through text message and the new Cabinet lineup through the presidential spokesman.
Don’t such maneuvers betray a different form of arrogance? The public often criticizes these pawns, but forget that the one that should be examined the most is the president.
Could it be said that when Ma promised “complete responsibility,” he meant his pawns should assume responsibility?
In addition, the administrative responsibility for the government’s rescue operations for Morakot sits with the Cabinet, while the president and the national security mechanism should take political responsibility.
Ma could not just replace the ministers of national defense and foreign affairs and have the premier take all the responsibility.
If some argue that the Constitution ensures the right of the president to finish his or her term, why would the Watergate scandal have led to the resignation of US president Richard Nixon in 1974?
In the wake of Morakot, Ma’s approval rating plunged to 16 percent, while Liu’s fell to 11 percent. Now that Liu has resigned, Ma cannot just pretend that nothing has happened and continue to play with his new pawns as if he were free of responsibility.
If Ma has tried to divert public attention through his inspection tours to the disaster zones and the trial against former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), then the more than 700 lives claimed by Morakot were all wasted.
Lu I-ming is the former publisher and president of Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News.
TRANSLATED BY TED YANG
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