What world does President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) live in? After Typhoon Morakot, it is a world of images — images past and images present. It is a world of imaginary images that have been built on, fostered and fashioned by years of faulty Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) paradigms and reinforced by their propaganda.
In the mind of Ma, his party and his spin-masters, image has always trumped performance. Taiwanese are finally realizing this and realizing that regardless of his words, Ma has no idea what it is to be Taiwanese.
Ma grew up on images of Chinese grandeur. As his parents’ only son, his family’s hopes were pinned on him; in the eyes of his four doting sisters, he could do no wrong; he was cast in the image of family hero.
His family ranked high in the KMT, a party of colonial outsiders who imagined that it was their destiny to save the inferior Taiwanese.
The KMT, too, could do no wrong. Disregarding why they lost the war against the communists and forced to flee China, the KMT educated Ma to fit with the image of a glorious one-party state that would one day return as heroes to China.
But images are only images. Sooner or later, everyone must face reality. For Ma and the people of Taiwan, Typhoon Morakot hastened this.
The foreign media had previously been kind to Ma, fostering his image as a “Harvard-educated lawyer,” even though he never passed the bar exam in either the US or Taiwan.
Former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and Ma’s rival for the presidency, Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), did pass the bar exam in Taiwan, but the foreign media has never touted their legal backgrounds. Ma surely felt he had the advantage.
Likewise, countries like the US and others portray Ma as a statesman, leader and peacemaker in the Taiwan Strait. It is an image with little substance: Ma has done little to earn it except acquiesce to Chinese demands and downplay Taiwan’s identity and sovereignty.
This image of Ma suits the agendas of those countries and their economies and so has their support.
Even Ma has bought into this idea of himself, coming to believe that he is a statesman and peacemaker. That fits with his image of himself: He can do no wrong.
Then came Typhoon Morakot and its unprecedented floods. The destruction is not an image but reality and has tested Ma’s leadership.
As Taiwan struggles to recover from Morakot, the public is seeing a different man in Ma. When action was needed, Ma offered hesitation. Foremost in his mind, it seemed, was not the devastation in the south but rather how to protect his image with China and the world.
What effect would it have on his image in China as a peacemaker in favor of unification if he accepted help from other countries?
Ma is struggling to preserve his image as a leader. It is a tough struggle when everything points to faulty, ill-prepared and ill-coordinated government rescue efforts.
As commander-in-chief, Ma bears responsibility for this, and he knew that he would have to shoulder that responsibility sooner or later.
Yet it is clear from comments he has made to media that his idea of shouldering responsibility is finding someone else to blame — someone that can take the fall for him and protect his image.
This strategy worked when Ma was accused of corruption and mishandling funds. His secretary served time in jail for depositing nearly US$500,000 in Ma’s bank account.
Despite this, local and foreign media preserved his image as squeaky clean.
But there are other, deeper struggles. Ma is struggling to identify with and empathize with the public.
He spoke of the victims in terms of “they” and not “we” after the typhoon struck: They should have gotten out of the way; they should have had foresight.
But this time, the public is not buying Ma’s talk. They have lost too much and suffered too much and will not tolerate being labeled as fools who should have gotten out of the way of Morakot.
The survivors of Morakot know who helped them and who didn’t and how long it took before help arrived. The public has finally come face to face with the real Ma, not the image of the man they had chosen for president.
Jerome Keating is a writer based in Taipei.
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