On May 20, the first anniversary of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) inauguration, Ma repeated his view that only issues involving independence or unification need to be put to a referendum, and that there was no need for a referendum to decide on his proposed economic cooperation framework agreement (ECFA) with China.
On the same day, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Central Standing Committee initiated a push for a referendum on the ECFA proposal. This again highlighted the distance between the ruling and opposition camps, as well as the fact that, in lieu of a consensus-building mechanism between the government, the opposition and the public, referendums have become a last resort.
The Ma government has emphasized that an ECFA referendum is unnecessary because the pact is an economic matter unrelated to sovereignty, and that public opinion can be understood through opinion polls.
The results of a poll released by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in mid-April showed that 70 percent of people believe signing an ECFA is “necessary.” Memorandums issued by the MAC and the Ministry of Economic Affairs also said referendums were almost never held when other countries signed free trade agreements. So why would an ECFA referendum be necessary, given that the issue does not involve sovereignty, is supported by a majority of voters and that there is no precedent for it?
There are a number of reasons. First, the confrontation over sovereignty between Taiwan and China makes an ECFA highly political and controversial even if it does not refer to sovereignty directly.
For example, the government refused to accept China’s proposed Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement because of sovereignty concerns. Premier Liu Chao-shiuan (劉兆玄) stressed that an ECFA would only be signed if it would not damage Taiwan’s sovereignty. Beijing would also not be allowed to impose a “one China” framework before cross-strait talks, and the ECFA would have to be reported to the WTO after being signed.
Second, many Taiwanese worry about the negative political impact of an ECFA.
The results of an opinion poll released by the DPP in mid-March showed that 48.8 percent of respondents said an ECFA would result in excessive economic dependence on China and affect Taiwan’s autonomy, while 43 percent disagreed. A TVBS poll that same month found that 28 percent of respondents agreed that an ECFA would push the sides toward unification, while 53 percent disagreed. In an MAC poll in April, 37.7 percent of respondents said an ECFA would belittle Taiwan’s sovereignty, while 53.6 percent disagreed. And a Council for Industrial and Commercial Development (CICD) poll in late April said 56.2 percent of respondents worried that Taiwan was economically dependent on China.
Third, there are limits to the reliability of polls. The TVBS and DPP polls found that 71 percent and 44.7 percent of respondents respectively were unclear about the ECFA. The CICD poll showed that merely 10 percent of respondents understood the content of the ECFA, while 47.5 percent did not know whether to support it or not. As most people do not understand the ECFA, there is a large gap between these results and the high support ratings reported in the MAC poll.
Fourth, the government is not telling the truth, as there are numerous examples of referendums on economic integration agreements. For example, 19 of the EU’s 27 members held referendums on economic integration as part of the EU. Elsewhere, Costa Rica held a referendum in October 2007 on whether to join the US-proposed North America Free Trade Agreement.
Fifth, most Taiwanese support a referendum on the ECFA. The TVBS poll found that 48 percent of respondents favored a referendum, while 36 percent did not. The DPP poll found that 63.8 percent of respondents believed an ECFA involved sovereignty and that the issue should be put to a referendum; 32.3 percent opposed disagreed. Finally, a Taiwan Solidarity Union poll on April 21 found that 59.8 percent of respondents said the issue should be determined by referendum; 23.3 percent disagreed.
In light of serious cross-strait tension and intensifying conflict within Taiwan’s political scene, society in general may not be able to reach a clear consensus through dialogue.
As the government pushes for cross-strait talks on an ECFA, greater confrontation between the ruling and opposition camps will emerge. This may prompt resistance from the industries and the labor groups that stand to suffer the most.
A referendum resolves this issue at the lowest social cost. It would also strengthen the legitimacy of the ECFA policy.
Tung Chen-yuan is an associate professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies at National Chengchi University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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