The US Pacific Command, which controls US forces from the west coast of North America to the east coast of Africa, has fashioned a subtle revision in its strategy of reassuring friends and deterring potential enemies, notably China and North Korea.
The new strategy, approved this month by the command’s leader, Admiral Timothy Keating, is “based on partnership, presence and military readiness.” Earlier versions were more assertive, saying “it is a strategy rooted in partnership and military preeminence.”
In his cover letter authorizing the new strategy, Keating said “it underscores the fundamental importance of sustained and persistent cooperation and collaboration in times of relative peace to mitigate situations that could lead to conflict and crisis.”
Many Asians and some Americans have accused the US of going it alone and failing to consult with allies and friends, smacking of what some would call “unilateralism.” In his 15 months as the Pacific commander, Keating has sought to dispel that image and to stress collective action.
At the same time, the admiral said the emphasis on security cooperation “does not signal a departure from our primary responsibility to fight and win.”
Even so, he said, the Pacific Command would accentuate a posture intended to “preclude the necessity for combat operations.”
Officers at the command’s headquarters said the revised strategy was aimed at several audiences:
First, the officers of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force throughout the Asia-Pacific region, some of whom apparently believe that conflict with China is likely, maybe inevitable.
“The command wants to make sure that everyone understands that it is not inevitable,” one officer said.
Second, US government agencies other than the Department of Defense. An undercurrent rumbling through the armed forces contends that the State Department, Agency for International Development, Treasury and other agencies are leaving too many non-military tasks, such as reconstruction in Iraq, to the military.
Third, allies such as Japan and Australia and partners such as Singapore. Another undercurrent represents fears that the US may reduce its forces in the Asia-Pacific region or even withdraw. The strategy seeks to reassure everyone that the command will be “an engaged and trusted partner committed to preserving the security” of the region.
Fourth, known adversaries such as North Korea and potential opponents such as China.
“Deterring conflict on the Korean Peninsula continues to be a priority,” the strategy says.
It points to a “maturing US-China military-to-military relationship” while acknowledging that “tension remains across the Taiwan Strait.”
Taiwan, of course, is the most likely cause of war between China and the US. Beijing contends that Taiwan is part of China and has threatened to use military force to conquer it. The US insists that the fate of Taiwan be determined peaceably and in accord with the wishes of the people.
The revised strategy calls for a “whole-of-government approach,” asserting that security in the Asia-Pacific region “demands a high degree of coordination, integration and unity of effort” within the Pentagon and across other departments and agencies.
The document applauds Australia and Japan for joining the US “in developing a trilateral partnership dedicated to improving security in the region.”
It further points to trilateral cooperation among the US, South Korea and Japan, which may be no more than a diplomatic nicety as the Japanese disdain the Koreans and the Koreans distrust the Japanese. The US tries to deal with each even handedly but rarely do they work together.
Among the strategy’s more striking pledges is the Pacific Command’s commitment to freedom of movement, particularly through the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea. More ships sail through that passage in a year that through the Suez and Panama canals combined. The document flatly states that the command will not “tolerate disruptions to global supply chains or threats to lines of communication and commerce.”
On China, the Pacific Command has sought for more than a decade to assure the Chinese that the US is not out to contain or repress China. At the same time, Pacific commanders have cautioned the Chinese not to underestimate US military power in the Asia-Pacific region nor the willingness of the US to use it.
Even with the emphasis on partnership, the strategy concludes on an assertive note: In the Asia-Pacific region, the command is to be the “pre-eminent warfighter.”
Richard Halloran is a writer based in Hawaii.
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